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I. INTRODUCTION
The lawfulness of sharing 1 copyrighted works has always been
contested, 2 but never so hotly as it is today. The marriage of digital
technology and information products creates remarkable opportunities for
digital file-sharing, 3 and new disputes asking when copyright law should
give copyright owners control over sharing of copies of their works. 4 This
Article broadens the terms of the sharing debate by recognizing that file1. Part I of the Article defines sharing and discusses examples in more detail. It also comments
on the relationship of sharing to piracy.
2. Before the Internet, sharing controversies arose because of reproductions made with
photocopiers and videotape machines, see infra text accompanying notes 167-89, 215-17, because of
commercial music, software, and videotape rental, see infra text accompanying notes 97-100, and
because of public performance of music, see infra text accompanying notes 89-92.
3.
Music file-sharing is the most popular new form of sharing. An estimated forty million
Americans swapped music over the Internet in December 2002. See Press Release, Ipsos News Center,
Legal Issues Don't Hinder American Downloaders, at http://www.ipsos-reid.com/pdf/media/mr0303142revis.pdf (Mar. 14, 2003). Movie file-sharing is becoming popular and video files now account for an
estimated 21% of all shared files, but such movie-sharing is currently limited by the fact that a movie
file can take from one to twelve hours to download. See Mark Niesse, Getting Illegal
Moviesfor
Free
Has
Never
Been
Easier,
MACON
TELEGRAPH,
at
http://www.macon.con/mld/macon/news/local/5943833.htm (May 25, 2003). Movies and music are
also copied and exchanged on CDs and DVDs. See id. Software is copied and shared over the Internet
and over local computer networks. See Andrew Graham, Illinois State U.: Study Examines Technology
Piracy Worldwide, DAILY VIDETrE, Jan. 20, 2002, 2002 WL 100287912. Finally, "individuals can
create personal online 'radio' stations, transmitting their music selections to anyone on the Intemet who
cares to listen." See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-toPeer File Sharing, 17 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 1, 38 (2003).
4. Lawsuits by the music industry have derailed Napster and other music file-sharing services.
See, e.g., In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1069
(2004); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002). Nevertheless music filesharing continues apace. See supra note 3. Copyright owners hope that digital rights management
technology aided by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") will eventually control filesharing. See infra Part VI. They are also pressing Congress to require digital equipment makers to build
safeguards into consumer products that discourage copying and sharing of copyrighted works. See infra
note 296. Equipment makers and Internet service providers indirectly benefit from sharing because it
increases demand for their products and services. They have resisted measures to control sharing; they
characterize the measures as costly and intrusive regulation. See infra note 5.
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sharing is just one member of a diverse set of sharing behaviors that occur
in copyright protected markets. Books and recorded movies are shared by
lending-books are lent by public libraries at no charge, while movies are
rented for a fee. Owners of copyrighted works often share their copies by
performing them for an audience. The audience might be children listening
to a bedtime story, friends watching a recorded movie together, patrons at a
bar listening to recorded music, and so forth. Finally, users share many
sorts of works via private reproduction using computers, video and audio
recorders, photocopiers, and scanners.
Copyright law specifies a mixed pattern of rights over sharing.
Copyright owners have worked effectively to exert control over many
forms of sharing, but powerful business groups have defended users'
sharing rights as a means of increasing their profit.5 The two sides have
wrestled in Congress and the courts over the scope of various copyright
provisions, 6 especially the fair use doctrine,7 the main arena for conflict
over sharing rights and the main focus of this Article.
The received wisdom regarding copyright policy toward sharing
explains fair use as a response to market failure. 8 Wendy Gordon illustrates
the logic of the market failure analysis with the example of a teacher who
makes last-minute photocopies of a text to share with a class. 9 Gordon
argues the teacher should be protected from a copyright infringement suit
by the fair use defense because there is no market for spontaneous
photocopies. Insurmountable transaction costs prevent a teacher from
seeking permission from the copyright owner and therefore cause market
failure.' ° Fair use is socially desirable in this case because the seller does
5. See John Borland, Tech Giants Pan Anti-Piracy Mandate, CNETNews.com, at
http://news.com.com/news/2102-1023_3-274763 (Oct. 22, 2001) (reporting that Intel, IBM, Microsoft,
and Compaq Computer joined forces to oppose proposed legislation that would require anticopying
technology in computers and other consumer electronic devices).
6. See Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, in COPY FIGHTS: THE
FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 125, 130-31 (Adam Thierer & Clyde

Wayne Crews Jr. eds., 2002).
7.
See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014-19 (9th Cir. 2001).
8.
See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982) [hereinafter
Betamax] (applying market failure theory to sharing and also a variety of individual uses); Wendy J.
Gordon, Market Failureand Intellectual Property: A Response to ProfessorLunney, 82 B.U. L. REV.
1031, 1031-34 (2002) [hereinafter Market Failure] (noting the central role of market failure in fair use
analysis and urging commentators to remember that market failure includes more than high transaction

costs).
9.
10.

See Betamax, supra note 8, at 1628.
See id. Gordon argues that the law should allow buyers to share without permission when (1)

transaction costs block a market transaction with one of the sharing users; (2) the use made possible by
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not lose any profit from sharing and consumer surplus rises because of the
unauthorized use. The transaction cost theory has been embraced by courts
and commentators,'' but lately it has come under attack on the view that
digital technology is removing impediments to transactions and
undercutting this rationale for fair use.1 2 The rationale is also limited by the
possibility that fair use will discourage the development of licensing
markets and institutions that reduce transaction costs. 13
This Article presents a new account of sharing and fair use that
incorporates the transaction cost approach but discards the market failure
orientation.14 An emphasis on market failure is misleading. The absence of
a market for spontaneous photocopies does not represent a market failure,
if (as seems likely) librarians indirectly account for the value created by
spontaneous photocopying when they purchase texts for the library. 15 The
sharing is socially desirable; and (3) sharing does not have deleterious consequences for the incentive to
create the copyrighted work. Id. at 1614-22. She has relaxed her insistence on the third factor recently,
and might now support a finding of fair use even if there is substantial injury to the copyright owner
from the use in question. See Market Failure,supra note 8, at 1031-32.
11.
See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1388-89 (6th Cir.
1996) (en banc); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929-31 (2d Cir. 1994). Cf
Agreement on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educational Institutions with
Respect to Books and Periodicals, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68-70 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5681-83 (specifying standards of "educational fair use" photocopying).
12. See text accompanying notes 148-150; Betamax, supra note 8, at 1620-21 (suggesting that
transaction costs might decline over time).
13. See Betamax, supra note 8, at 1620-21; infra text accompanying notes 149-51.
14. Glynn Lunney objects to the market failure approach to fair use and argues for a public goods
approach:
Because of the public good character of copyrighted works, the private rights that copyrights
creates [sic] will lead inevitably to market failure. Because market failure is inevitable, the
concept of market failure cannot serve as a useful guide in determining which uses of a
copyrighted work should be fair and which uses unfair ....
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure:Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975, 996 (2002).
Cf Market Failure, supra note 8, at 1034 (expressing disappointment with "the way the market failure
approach has grown-up, or rather grown-down, since the publication of [Gordon's] original piece").
The market failure issue was addressed by the Supreme Court in the context of the public
performance right. In two cases decided before the 1976 copyright law revisions, the Court held that
cable systems did not perform by retransmitting television signals and hence they did not violate the
copyright performance right. See Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968). As a result of these decisions, movie copyright
owners could not negotiate directly with cable television companies over cable television movie
transmissions. See Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 410-11 (rejecting copyright owners' concern about the
"deleterious impact of such retransmission upon the economics and market structure of copyright
licensing"). They were limited to negotiations with television broadcasters. See id. at 413. The
Copyright Act of 1976 overturned these decisions by imposing liability on cable companies, and also
creating a compulsory licensing scheme. See 17 U.S.C. § 111 (2000).
15. The introduction of the photocopier increased sharing of academic journals in libraries,
which caused publishers to increase the price of library journal subscriptions relative to individual
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library as a locus of sharing also plays an important role in reducing
transaction (and other) costs. 16 If teachers faced high transaction costs
when they tried to make a last-minute photocopy in a library, then it would
be proper to say there was a market failure. The real issue is whether
copyright owners have the right to compel direct negotiations with each
teacher, or whether instead they have to be content to deal with an
intermediary. 17 In other words, application of fair use impairs the ability of
a copyright owner to control sharing and shape the market. 18
Proper analysis of sharing requires attention to the ways copyright law
shapes markets.19 It also requires an analytic framework that identifies the
subscriptions. See S. J. Liebowitz, Copying and Indirect Appropriability: Photocopying of Journals,93
J. POL. ECON. 945, 952-53 (1985).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 55-56.
17. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 927 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that
authors of journal articles do not publish their works themselves, instead selling their rights to
publishers that market their works). Cf Betamax, supra note 8, at 1649 (discussing collective rights
organizations and noting that "[c]onventional one-on-one bargaining is not the only alternative").
18. William Fisher analyzes the market effect of sharing in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984), and raises the question of how broadly the market should be defined.
See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661, 1669-72
(1988). The facts of Sony contain two complications I want to sidestep. First, Sony presented a question
about personal copying of television programs and not a question of sharing. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 420.
Personal copies are often made so a viewer can "time-shift," that is, watch a television program at a
later time. Similarly, personal copying of music allows a listener to "space-shift," that is, listen to music
in a different location. The time-shifting use emphasized by the Sony Court involved reproduction for
the direct benefit of the viewer, not for the purpose of sharing the movie with a friend or family
member. Second, viewers do not pay for television broadcasts. Cassette audio-taping of music is easier
to discuss. Copyright scholars assume that it is fair use for a consumer who purchases a record to make
a cassette tape recording of the record. The consumer can use the cassette in her car or give the cassette
to a friend. The first use is outside the scope of this Article, because there is no sharing. But the same
copyright policy question is present. Should copyright law give the seller the right to control the spaceshifting? Should there be a space-shifting market? Once again, it makes no sense to say the market fails
to exist. The consumer purchased the record. The real question is whether the consumer should have to
transact separately for the record and the right to make a cassette recording. These issues are discussed
in Michael J. Meurer, Vertical Restraintsand Intellectual Property Law: Beyond Antitrust, 87 MINN. L.
REV. 1871, 1883-89 (2003) [hereinafter VerticalRestraints].
19. Certain forms of sharing have been thoughtfully analyzed under the copyright fair use
doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 136-43, but failure to appreciate fully the economic
implications of sharing has impeded policy analysis. Recognition that sharing is regulated by other
copyright doctrines (such as the first sale doctrine and the public performance right) is very recent. See
Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination,23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55, 109-16 (2001)
[hereinafter Price Discrimination] (public performance right); Vertical Restraints, supra note 18, at
1883-84 (first sale doctrine).
Judicial and scholarly analysis of sharing is fragmented and incomplete. Copyright commentators
barely recognize the extent and importance of sharing. For recent discussions of sharing copyrighted
works, see Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-OrientedApproach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1525 (2004); Price Discrimination, supra, at 132-40; Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination,
PersonalUse and Piracy: Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845, 880-82 (1997)
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gains and losses to copyright owners and users operating under the
different market forms that can be sustained by different versions of
copyright law. My framework will help judges avoid two mistakes that a
market failure orientation invites. First, some judges overemphasize
transaction costs and fail to appreciate the reasons to apply fair use to
sharing even when negotiation and payment costs are zero. 20 One reason is
well known: sharing that generates positive externalities may be treated as
a fair use in order to subsidize it. 2 1 This Article shows that fair use can be
justified even in the absence of transaction costs and positive
externalities. 22 Second, some judges lose track of copyright law's objective,
encouraging production and distribution of authors' works, and concentrate
too much on simply curing market failure. In some cases it is appropriate to
deny fair use to encourage the development of institutions that reduce
transaction costs and cure market failure. 23 In other cases fair use should be
used to discourage the development of socially wasteful institutions and
redundant markets.24 Too many markets can be as harmful as too few.2 5
[hereinafter Digital Works]; and Vertical Restraints, supra note 18, at 1883-89. For two articles in the
economic literature that explore sharing broadly see Yannis Bakos, Erik Brynjolfsson & Douglas
Lichtman, Shared Information Goods, 42 J.L. & ECON. 117 (1999) and Hal R. Varian, Buying, Sharing
and Renting Information Goods, 48 J. INDUS. ECoN. 473 (2000). The extensive literature on copyright
law and file-sharing generally does not discuss sharing of copyrighted works outside the file-sharing
context. See, e.g., Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New
Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002); Deborah Tussey, From Fan Sites to
Filesharing:Personal Use in Cyberspace, 35 GA. L. REV. 1129 (2001).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 153-56.
21. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 477-79 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Betamax, supra note 8, at 1630;
Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright
Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PRoP. L. 1, 49-53 (1997). For a discussion of the subsidy rationale for
fair use, see Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction?Property Rights and Contractin the "Newtonian"
World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 115, 134-35 (1997).

22. Fair use has been justified on a variety of other grounds. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade,
Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1521-27 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing how fair use promotes efficient market
structure); C. Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 VAND. L. REV. 891, 941-45
(2002) (arguing that fair use protects and promotes freedom of speech and of the press); Ben Depoorter
& Francesco Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright Protection:A Price Theory Explanation, 21 INT'L REV. L.
& ECON. 453, 453 (2002) (suggesting that fair use combats inefficient pricing of complementary
copyrighted inputs); Betamax, supra note 8, at 1632 (arguing that fair use offsets copyright owners'
antidissemination motives); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the FirstAmendment
Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 81-85 (2001) (arguing that fair use protects and promotes freedom of speech
and of the press); Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, 11l YALE L.J. 1575 (2002) (discussing how fair use promotes efficient market structure).
None of these justifications, however, seem to apply to sharing that is allowed as fair use.
23. The Copyright Clearance Center is one such valuable institution for administering corporate
photocopying licenses and reducing transaction costs.
24. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 937 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
25. For a background discussion of the concept of market failure and an explanation for why
creating too many markets is socially harmful, see John 0. Ledyard, Market Failure, in THE NEW

2004]

TOO MANY MARKETS OR TOO FEW?

Part II describes different ways that users share copyrighted works and
how copyright law influences sharing. Parts III and IV explore the
relationship between sharing and profit. Part III builds a model of sharing
and uses it to identify four aspects of sharing that affect a copyright
owner's profit.26 Part IV examines the historical record for evidence
indicating when sharing increases or decreases profit. The results from Part
III and Part IV will improve the market effect analysis required in fair use
cases. Courts tend to focus too narrowly on lost sales (and licensing
revenue) when they assess market effects. Sharing usually does cause sales
to fall, but the effect on profit is not so clear. Sellers can raise their price in
the face of sharing because consumers are willing to pay more for products
that they can share. 27 A seller's price response to sharing offsets the effect
of lost sales, and profit can rise or fall.28 The easiest way to see this point is
to suppose that all potential end-users of a product have the same valuation,
V, for the product. Also suppose that the marginal cost of producing and
distributing the product is zero. In a world without sharing, the seller could
set a price of V and earn a profit of V per end-user. In a world in which
every potential end-user paired up and shared with one other end-user, the
seller could set a price of 2V and once again earn a profit of V per end-user.
Despite cutting sales by 50%, the combined effect of sharing and the
PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 326, 327 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987) ("Curing one form
of market failure can lead to another."). This is different from the tragedy of the anticommons that
arises when too many property rights are created. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can
Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698-99
(1998). The tragedy of the anticommons causes underutilization of intellectual property because of
hold-out problems and other costs arising from assembling fragmented property rights. The
inefficiencies discussed in this Article arise from concentrating "too many" rights in the hands of a
single copyright owner.
26.
This Article develops a simple economic model that unifies the analysis of copyright policy
toward sharing. My approach is similar to those used in two earlier articles. See Bakos et al., supra note
19; Varian, supra note 19. Bakos, Brynjolfsson and Lichtman analyze sharing of software and digital
content. Varian analyzes the sharing of copyrighted works via video rental, resale, site licensing, and
library lending. While this Article mainly addresses the copyright policy implications of sharing, earlier
articles address the positive question of what effect sharing has on profit. This Article also incorporates
a more extensive treatment of transaction costs and price discrimination than the earlier articles.
27.
Colin C. Haley, Buyers Would Pay More to Copy Digital Music, Internetnews.com, at
http://boston.internet.com/news/article.php/2109811 (Mar. 14, 2003) (reporting that a survey of 1700
consumers by Jupiter Research reveals that consumers are willing to pay significantly more for movies
and music that can be copied).
28.
See S.J. LIEBOwrrz, THE IMPACT OF REPROGRAPHY ON THE COPYRIGHT SYSTEM (Bureau of
Corporate
Affairs,
Canada,
Copyright
Revision
Studies,
1981),
available
at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/cf dev/AbsbyAuth.cfm?per_id=59984; Liebowitz, supra note 15, at 956;
Price Discrimination,supra note 19, at 138-40; Digital Works, supra note 19, at 881; Tussey, supra
note 19, at 1177-78.
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pricing response is to leave profit unchanged.29 Parts III and IV flesh out
this simple story and show that sharing can be a blessing or a curse for

copyright owners.
Parts V, VI, and VII explore the limits of a presumption arising from
30
economic analysis and favoring copyright owner control of sharing.
Copyright owners favor control over sharing because control adds to their
profit. They can justify this policy on the ground that it maximizes the
incentive to create copyrighted works. Furthermore, the profit motive
usually guides owners to make socially optimal decisions about whether to
authorize sharing. Generally, socially valuable forms of sharing increase
the size of the copyright pie, and owners will allow such sharing and claim
a larger portion of the pie. Similarly, owners will block socially harmful
forms of sharing that shrink the size of the pie and threaten profit.
Despite the merit of these arguments, copyright law allows users to
engage in many types of sharing without permission from copyright
owners. 3 1 Consider, for example, sharing made possible by the VCR.
Hollywood lost two contests for control over videotape in the 1980s. First,
the Supreme Court decided private videotaping of televised movies is not
29.

If the users who receive shared copies are not in the market before sharing, then sharing does

not hurt profit and might increase it. See STAN LIEBOWrrz, POLICING PIRATES IN THE NETWORKED AGE

4, 35-36 (Cato Policy Analysis, No. 438, 2002), http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-438es.html.
30. The presumption arises from the standard view in economics that a seller will choose
marketing practices that maximize total surplus so that the seller can maximize profit. For an example
of an electronic publisher that explicitly permits certain kinds of sharing in its licenses, see the BNA
Internet Law Registration Form at http://www.bna.com/ilaw/terms.htm (last visited July 8, 2004)
("BNA will distribute one (1) direct E-mail message per registered recipient. The recipient may forward
the E-mail Service(s) to colleagues, students and friends and encourage them to register to receive their
own personal copy of this complimentary e-mail service."). Whether this presumption forms a good
foundation for policy toward sharing is debatable. Perhaps copyright owners are not always rational
when making decisions about sharing. The movie industry opposed video rental, but has profited
enormously from that form of sharing. See Video Rental and Sales Revenue Statistics, About.com, at
http://retailindustry.about.com/library/bl/02q3/bl-vsda071502.htm?terms=video+rental+statistics (last
visited July 9, 2004) (reporting that in 2001 Americans spent $7 billion on VHS rentals and $1.4 billion
on DVD rentals). Perhaps there are other important social values that are not captured by the total
surplus measure of social welfare. See James Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price
Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2033-34 (2000) (arguing
that the economic approach to copyright ignores the value of browsing and the importance of privacy);
Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1808-14 (2000) (arguing
that economic rewards may not stimulate production of a good mix of copyrighted works); Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 324-36 (1996)
(arguing that the economic approach to copyright has not addressed First Amendment values
effectively). I see merit in these criticisms, but they ire not so serious that they dissuade me from using
the standard economic approach as my starting po
31. See infra Part II.
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infringing under the fair use doctrine. 32 And second, Congress refused to
prohibit unauthorized commercial rental of videotapes. 33 This Article will
show that a more sophisticated economic analysis of sharing largely
explains these departures from a policy of owner control.
Sound analysis sets aside the presumption in favor of owner control
when there is reason to believe that the copyright owner's profit incentive
34
is misaligned with the social interest in social welfare maximization.
Unfortunately, copyright owners may exercise control over sharing in a
way that raises their profit but also decreases the size of the pie. Owner
control may be socially harmful when (1) the owner blocks socially
valuable sharing because it is unprofitable, and (2) the owner inefficiently
distorts the nature of sharing to gain more profit.
Misalignment of private and social incentives is necessary but not
sufficient to make the case for users' right to share. A complete case for a
right to share requires attention to the trade-off between the social value
from broad access to copyrighted works 35 and the need to provide a profitbased incentive to stimulate creation and distribution of those works. 36 At
its very core, copyright law recognizes the importance of owner control as
a source of productive incentives. To assure adequate incentives, copyright
law tolerates and even promotes access restrictions imposed by copyright
owners. 37 Thus, copyright law should recognize a right to share when the
profit-based incentives of copyright owners are misaligned with the social
incentive in maximizing ex post total surplus, provided the social cost in
32.
See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
33.
See infra note 99.
34.
See Bakos et al., supra note 19, at 148 ("[P]rofitability and social efficiency need not go hand
in hand: sharing can be profitable [for sellers] in situations where it is not efficient, and efficient in
situations where it is not profitable.").
35.
See Sony, 464 U.S. at 455 n.40 (emphasizing consumer access as an important policy goal of
copyright law).
36.
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 325, 343 (1989) (discussing the trade-off between incentives and access); Jonathan
Weinberg, Hardware-Based ID, Rights Management, and Trusted Systems, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1251,
1277 (2000) (discussing sharing as reducing productive incentives).
37. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 429. It is difficult to calibrate copyright policy with little empirical
evidence on how the production of copyrighted works responds to profit incentives. If existing
incentives for creation are too large, then it might be socially desirable to reduce profit (and the
accompanying incentive to create). See Lunney, supra note 14, at 1018-20 (contending that the high
rents for popular television shows do not produce much of an incentive because they are dissipated in
transfers to the stars); Price Discrimination, supra note 19, at 95-97; MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ,
COPYRIGHT REDUNDANCY 4-7 (George Mason Sch. of Law, Law and Econ. Working Paper Series No.
03-03, 2003), at http://ssm.com/abstract=374580.
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terms of lost productive incentive is not too great. 38 This Article elaborates
this policy approach and applies it to the fair use doctrine in Part V. Part VI
discusses the strategies used by copyright owners to influence the pattern of
sharing and the optimal role for copyright law in encouraging selective
enforcement and encryption. Part VII addresses copyright policy toward
the technology and institutions that facilitate sharing. Specifically, it covers
regulation and taxation of technology used for copying as well as indirect
copyright infringement by parties who facilitate sharing.
II. THREE TYPES OF SHARING
I define sharing 39 to be any activity such that (1) a single copy of a
work provides utility to more than one end-user, and (2) the number of
sharing users is relatively small. Three types of sharing occur in markets
38.
My use of the term "lost productive incentive" is problematic, because there are two different
choices for a benchmark. One choice compares the profits and incentives in a market with unregulated
sharing to a market without sharing. The other choice compares the profits and incentives in a market
with unregulated sharing to a market in which the copyright owner controls sharing. The choice of
benchmark is not likely to matter much when sharing has a relatively small effect on profit and total
surplus. The choice could make a difference when the effects are large. In theory, the second choice is
better, in practice the first choice is easier to implement. Comparing profit levels before and after the
introduction of a new type of sharing might understate the incentive effect. If a new type of sharing
significantly increases total surplus, then a significant increase in profit-based incentives might be
socially desirable. On the other hand, comparing profit levels with and without copyright owner control
asks a court to compare a market subject to recent shock to a counterfactual market.
39.
The political struggle over copyright protection of digital works influences usage of the term
sharing, with the two sides in the struggle emphasizing alternative definitions of sharing. The American
HeritageDictionary offers two definitions of the transitive verb "share": "1. To divide and parcel out in
shares; apportion. 2. To participate in, use, or experience in common: share responsibilities;share an
apartment." AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1127 (2d coll. ed. 1982). The first definition suggests a
fixed resource, thus the act of sharing causes the benefactor to give up something. File-sharing and
performance are not sharing in this sense, but lending and resale are. In many contexts, the second
definition suggests nonrivalry in consumption; thus the act of sharing brings an enjoyable experience to
another at no detriment to the benefactor. All three modes of sharing discussed in this Part are covered
by the second definition. A cartoon by Hilary B. Price captures the essence of this debate. The cartoon
pictures a teacher standing before a kindergarten class as she announces, "Class, today's lesson on
sharing has been canceled. It will be replaced by a lesson called 'protecting intellectual property."'
Hilary B. Price, Intellectual Property, at www.rhymeswithorange.com (Jan. 23, 2000). See also A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (discussing the meaning of
sharing and theft in the Napster context), affid in part, rev'd in part by 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001);
Kate
Leadbetter,
Rights
Group
Defends
P2P
in
Ad
Campaign,
at
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/intemet/0,39020369,2136872,00.htm (July 1, 2003) (reporting that the
Electronic Frontier Foundation launched an advertising campaign encouraging Congress to legalize
music file-sharing).
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protected by copyright: consecutive use through lending or resale; joint use
40
through performance; and reproduction and simultaneous use.
41
Consumers often buy, sell, and lend used books, movies, and music.
Public libraries are the locus of much sharing; they lend books and other
copyrighted works to the public at no charge. Video stores rent and sell
used videotapes and DVDs. Music rental made a brief appearance in the
U.S. market but disappeared after a copyright amendment barred
unauthorized commercial rental of music. 42 The same amendment
prohibited unauthorized commercial software rental. 43 The first sale
doctrine of copyright law allows owners of books, movies, and music to
sell their copies in the used market. This doctrine shelters intermediaries in
the business of buying and selling used copyrighted works. In contrast, we
rarely see the sale of used software. Software publishers license rather than
sell their product so they can block resale. The Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act and some case law sanction licenses that bar
resale. 44 Other case law characterizes purported licenses as sales and
refuses to enforce resale restrictions.4 5

Copyrighted works can be shared by performance. Children's books
are shared when a parent reads aloud to his children. The owner of
recorded video or music can share a performance of the copyrighted work
40. 1 can think of a fourth type of sharing: the joint purchase of a bundle that is unbundled and
distributed among the joint purchasers. For example, kids might share trading cards by jointly buying a
packet and distributing the cards. I exclude this category because I cannot think of significant copyright
related examples. Note that this Article analyzes end-users sharing end-products, not sharing by
creators-the sort of sharing, for example, that takes place in the open source software movement.
41. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Online Sales of Used Books Draw Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10,
2002, at Cl (relating that used book sales account for 15% of the book sales activity on Amazon.com;
these sales are among the most profitable for Amazon.com); Charles C. Mann, The Heavenly Jukebox,
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 2000, at 39, 57 (reporting that editors guess four or five people read every
copy of popular books and magazines).
42. See 17 U.S.C. §109(b)(l)(A) (2000).
43. Id.
44. See Adobe Sys., Inc. v. Stargate Software, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 2d. 1051, 1054-60 (N.D. Cal.
2002); Adobe Sys., Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1089-92 (N.D. Cal. 2000); UNIF.
COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 503(2) (amended 2002), 7 U.L.A. 352 (2002). See also Jean

Braucher, When Your RefrigeratorOrders Groceries Online and Your Car Dials 911 After an Accident:
Do We Really Need New Law for the World of Smart Goods?, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 241, 252-55
(2002).
45. SoftMan Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1083-87 (C.D. Cal. 2001)
(characterizing a software transaction as a sale despite language in the end-user license agreement
stating the transaction was a license). Antitrust law may restrict the ability of some sellers to block
resale. Cf United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 344-46 (D. Mass. 1953)
(holding that antitrust law invalidates lease-only policies applied to patented machinery), affd, 347 U.S.
521 (1954).
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with an audience. 46 Private performances of copyrighted works are outside
are subject to control
the reach of copyright law, but public performances
47
by the copyright owner under the Copyright Act.
The terms sharing and piracy are both used to describe small-scale
reproduction and distribution of a copyrighted work. 48 The piracy label is
used too broadly when applied to every act of copying, but it is appropriate
when applied to certain kinds of sharing that pose an especially great threat
to profits. 49 This Article identifies conditions when sharing severely erodes
profit, and so makes a contribution to the debate about how to characterize
these activities. I categorize small-scale reproduction and distribution as
sharing to emphasize its similarity to joint use and consecutive use in terms
of economic effects.
All three types of sharing feature a variety of organizational forms that
I will call "coalitions." End-users who share copies organize into local,
institutional, or anonymous coalitions. Local coalitions are formed among
friends and family. Membership in these coalitions is fixed by social
factors unrelated to the market for the particular work. Two examples of
local coalitions that reproduce and distribute copyrighted works are family
46. In a sense, movie exhibitors, television networks, and radio stations share copyrighted works
with the public. I do not consider those activities because the scale of dissemination is too large.
Similarly, visual art can be shared by display. Copyright distinguishes between public and private
display, and places only limited restrictions on the buyer's right to display a work.
47. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4), (6).
48. See Nicole B. Cisarez, Deconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine: The Cost of Personal and
Workplace Copying After American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 641, 714 (1996) (linking personal use to making a single copy and distinguishing it
from competitive use, which involves making multiple copies); Digital Works, supra note 19, at 852
(describing a distinction between sharing and piracy); LIEBOWrz, supra note 29, at 6-8 (describing the
role of the photocopying, videotaping, and audiotaping in making copies for sharing).
49. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 n.33 (1984)
(distinguishing time-shifting of movies using a videotape machine from stealing a jewel, on the basis
that stealing threatens profits and time-shifting does not); LAWRENCE LESS1G, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS:
THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 254-55 (2001) (noting the contested use of
"theft" and "property" in relation to music file-sharing and advocating a compulsory license); Tussey,
supra note 19, at 1136-37 (distinguishing small-scale sharing from large-scale redistribution of digital
works via the Intemet). In a recent clear example of piracy, Sega stopped dozens of Internet sites from

selling pirated versions of its videogames. Sega Cracks Down on Software Pirates, at
http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/07/biztech/articles/2 Isega-dreamcast.html (July 21, 2000). The
Sega videogames were reputed to have the strongest encryption among consumer software.
Nevertheless, pirates decoded and distributed the games. Id.
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members who share copies of recorded music and friends who share copies
50
of entertainment software.
Institutional coalitions are formed among users within businesses,
schools, and other organizations. To a large extent, membership in these
coalitions is fixed by institutional rules unrelated to the market for the
work. For example, every member of a university community gets access to
the university library and can use a photocopier to copy text borrowed from
the library. Similarly, every employee on a firm's local computer network
gets to share licensed software installed on the network server. 5 1 In these
examples, membership in the university community or employment in the
52
firm determines who participates in the coalition.
Anonymous coalitions are formed by strangers using the Internet or
the market, often with the aid of an intermediary. For example, Napster
provided software and services that facilitated the distribution of digital
music files among Napster users. Despite an adverse judgment in the
Napster case, online file-sharing is now well-established as a form of
anonymous small-scale 53 reproduction and distribution. Anonymous
sharing of digital copyrighted works was common even before Napster
introduced its peer-to-peer file-sharing technology as Internet users relied
on bulletin boards or chat rooms to trade photographs, music, and software.
Before the Internet, photocopying was probably the only significant form
of anonymous reproduction and small-scale distribution of copyrighted
works.

54

50.
See Ann Bartow, Libraries in a Digital and Aggressively Copyrighted World: Retaining
PatronAccess Through Changing Technologies, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 821, 824-25 (2001) (asserting that
copyrighted works are shared in homes, educational institutions, workplaces, and libraries).
51.
See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
52.
But membership in some institutional coalitions is sensitive to features in the market for the
work or invention that is shared. For example, the administrator of a local computer network can take
steps to limit the number of copies or simultaneous uses of software subject to a site license. The
number authorized to share can be adjusted as the coalition size changes.
53.
1 say "small-scale" because the number of files provided by any one source is small
compared to the scale of a typical music pirate. No doubt the aggregate effect of Napster-style sharing
can be quite large. Of course, the same comments apply to sharing facilitated by video rental stores and
public libraries.
54.
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States describes the role of the National Library of

Medicine in making photocopies of journal articles upon request from anonymous library patrons.
Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d 1345, 1348-49 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court 420 U.S.

376 (1975) (per curiam).

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:903

III. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE
IMPACT OF SHARING ON PROFIT
Sharing affects profit through four distinct pathways: production and
distribution costs; demand dispersion; price discrimination; and willingness
to pay. Positive and negative profit effects are possible through each of
these pathways. Sharing tends to increase profit when it reduces production
and distribution costs, reduces demand dispersion, makes price
discrimination more profitable, and increases buyers' willingness to pay.
For example, sharing software on a local computer network reduces
distribution costs and thereby increases profit from the sale of software.
Sharing on local networks also increases the dispersion of demand, which
reduces profit to a seller who charges the same price to every buyer. I will
explain that dispersion tends to hurt profit because it amplifies the
deadweight loss associated with monopoly pricing. The dispersion created
by local networks is a source of profit, however, if the seller can price
discriminate by offering a site license-that is, a schedule of fees that rises
with the number of users on the local network. Finally, sharing over a local
network reduces the number of sales, but it increases the willingness to pay
of the person who purchases on behalf of the local network, especially if
there are positive externalities created by having everyone in an institution
use the same kind of software.
A. COST SAVINGS
Sharing generally increases profit through cost savings, but the effect
can go either way. 55 Sellers benefit directly by avoiding production and
distribution costs on each foregone sale. 56 For example, photocopying
journal articles is probably more efficient than producing and distributing a
new journal, especially if a user only wants a few of the articles in a
journal. Internet delivery of digital content and software is tremendously
attractive because reproduction and distribution costs are trivial, and
because it avoids the handling and inventory costs associated with physical
media. Unauthorized file-sharing offers this cost advantage over traditional
55. Sharing raises profit when the transaction costs of sharing are less than the marginal cost of
producing and distributing the copyrighted work. See Stanley M. Besen & Sheila Nataraj Kirby, Private
Copying, Appropriability,and Optimal Copying Royalties, 32 J.L. & ECON. 255, 267 (1989); Varian,
supra note 19, at 485.
56. It is important to recognize that sellers can profit indirectly from sharing that reduces
transaction costs bome by users, because the cost reduction is likely to increase demand. Cf. Liebowitz,
supra note 15, at 948-49 (suggesting that the introduction of the photocopier made academic journals
more valuable and increased demand for journals relative to books).
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music and movie distribution, but the advantage will largely disappear
when authorized Internet delivery becomes routine.57 Fair use generally
provides a cost advantage by eliminating negotiation, payment, and
enforcement costs, but blanket licenses reduce these costs in the absence of
fair use. The advantage of fair use is further reduced if sellers substitute
costly copy protection (or some other form of self-help) for enforcement.
B. DEMAND SMOOTHING
Sharing affects the dispersion of demand and thereby affects profit. It
is easy to choose an optimal price when every buyer holds an identical
valuation-set the price at that valuation. But when buyers are
heterogeneous and have highly dispersed valuations, profit suffers. A
seller's ability to extract surplus from consumers is limited because
consumers hold private information about their valuations. The more
dispersion in valuations, the more valuable the private information is to
consumers and the greater the challenge to the seller in extracting surplus.
Sharing sometimes smoothes demand and makes it easier for a seller to
extract surplus; other times it increases dispersion and makes it harder. Let
me illustrate both phenomena in an example with three users who each
want to use one unit of a copyrighted work. Each unit can be produced at
zero marginal cost.58 Suppose users X and Y have valuations of 3, and user
Z has a valuation of 5. If no one shares then the seller will set a uniform
price of 3 to maximize profit. 59 Three sales generate a profit of 9. Next
suppose that X and Y form a coalition to share one unit, and they are willing
to pay any price up to their combined valuation of 6.60 Then the new
57. See John Borland, Altnet to Pay Kazaa Users for Swapping, CNETNews.com, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1025-3-1011827.html (June 1, 2003) (reporting that a firm plans to pay
Kazaa users to host and trade files as a means of distributing authorized content such as games, music,
and
movies);
May
Wong,
Apple
Web
Music
Venture
Ignites Industry,
at
http://www.rednova.comnews/stories/3/2003/05/l1/storyOOl.html
(May 11, 2003) (reporting that
Apple launched a service that offers downloads of music at the price of ninety-nine cents per song with
virtually no restrictions on personal use).
58. This assumption is not essential, and it conveniently highlights the critical role that buyer
demand plays in my analysis. Nevertheless, it is approximately correct in many copyright protected
markets. See Julie Holland Mortimer, Vertical Contracts in the Video Rental Industry 5 (Apr. 1, 2004)
(unpublished manuscript, at http://mortimer.fas.harvard.edu/04jmp40l.pdf) (noting that the marginal
cost of producing, packaging and shipping a prerecorded video is about $2); Richard
Roehl
& Hal
R. Varian,
Circulating Libraries and Video Rental Stores, at
http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue6_5/roehl/ (May 2001) (revealing that the marginal cost of
producing a video is about $1).
59. The only other sensible pricing choice is 5, which leads to one sale and a profit of 5.
60. Notice that this model is a suitable representation of the various forms of sharing described in
Part I. When X and Y share they get a value of 6 in one of four ways: (I) X purchases and lets Y copy
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monopoly price is 5, and the sale of two units increases profit to 10.
Sharing increases profit in this example because it reduces the dispersion of
valuations held by potential buyers. 6 1 In the case with no sharing, Z
enjoyed a surplus of 2 = 5 - 3. Because the seller could not identify Z, and
charge a higher price to her, there was no way for the seller to get more
from Z. When X and Y share, the price rises to 5 and Z's entire surplus
disappears. X and Y collectively enjoy a surplus of 1 = 3 + 3 - 5, which is
better than the zero surplus they received when they were not sharing. The
seller's gain of 2 from Z exceeds the loss of 1 to X and Y, and thus profit is
larger.
To see that sharing can increase demand dispersion and reduce profit,
suppose that X and Z form a coalition with a willingness to pay of 8, and Y
acts alone. The seller knows that one buyer holds a valuation of 3 and the
other holds a valuation of 8. Rather than setting a relatively low price of 3,
the seller would set the price at 8, yielding a profit of 8 from the sale of one
unit. Sharing reduces profit because it increases the dispersion of
valuations; the seller caters to the coalition with two members and Y is
62
priced out of the market.
Yannis Bakos, Erik Brynjolfsson, and Douglas Lichtman provide two
analytic insights that help understand sharing and demand smoothing. They
demonstrate that sharing reduces profit through a "coalition diversity
effect": when coalitions differ in size this heterogeneity tends to increase
dispersion in demand.6 3 They also demonstrate that sharing increases profit
through an "aggregation effect": coalitions aggregate individual valuations
and reduce the dispersion in demand because aggregation works like
averaging. 64 They conclude that sharing raises profit under a uniform price
when the aggregation effect dominates the coalition diversity effect. In both
and X is willing to pay up to 6 because (a) Y will pay one-half of the purchase price, or (b) X cares as
much about Y's utility as her own; (2) X uses a unit and then resells or lends the product to Yat a price
of 3; (3) X buys a unit and performs it for herself and Y, and Y either pays half of the price or X cares
about Y's utility; or (4) some third party purchases a unit and either sells a copy to X and Y, or rents to X
and Y, or performs for X and Y,and charges them each 3.
61. Sharing smoothes demand and reduces deadweight loss from monopoly pricing. See Bakos et
al., supra note 19, at 123-25.
62. If all three join a single coalition, then efficiency is restored. The price and profit and total
surplus are all equal to 11.
63. See Bakos et al., supra note 19, at 120-21.
64. Id. at 120. The intuition of the aggregation effect derives from the law of large numbers.
When a large number of independent random variables-such as the buyer valuations for a copyrighted
work-are averaged they tend toward a common value, the mean of the distribution. The sum (or
aggregate) of a set of random variables is simply equal to the mean times the number of variables in the
set. Therefore, sums of different sets also approach a common value.
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of my examples sharing creates coalition diversity because one coalition is
a singleton and the other is a pair. In the example in which X and Y share,
the coalition diversity effect is more than offset by the beneficial effect of
aggregating 65 the valuations of X and Y, and thus profit increases because
of sharing.
An understanding of the relationship between sharing and demand
smoothing makes better copyright policy only if we can predict whether the
coalition diversity effect or the aggregation effect is likely to be more
important, or more generally, whether sharing is likely to actually smooth
demand. We can make some predictions confidently; for example, the great
variance in the size of local computer networks means that sharing software
on local networks results in a strong coalition diversity effect. It is not
surprising, then, that copyright law precludes unauthorized sharing of
computer programs on local networks. 66 In contrast, when home software
users share business software with each other or with a business user, the
aggregation effect possibly smoothes demand because home users are
likely to have small valuations compared to business users.
Attention to the endogenous nature of some coalitions is useful when
predicting the impact of sharing on the dispersion of demand. The sort of
sharing facilitated by a video rental store smoothes demand and raises
profit. Video rental stores strive to hold an inventory of videotapes and
DVDs such that each tape and DVD gets about the same amount of usage.
In other words, they strive to eliminate coalition diversity by attempting to
get the same number of eyeballs to fall on each movie copy in their
inventory. 67 The video rental store acts as the purchasing agent for the
"coalition" of renters and derives a valuation for each coalition that reflects
the sum of the rental fees collected per copy owned by the store.68 At the
other end of the spectrum is much of the unauthorized file-sharing
facilitated by the Internet. The size of the coalitions that share digital music
65. The law of large numbers and the aggregation effect do not really apply to these examples
because only two values are being added, but the general idea of averaging through sharing does apply.
66. The next Section explains that software publishers allow sharing on local networks under the
terms of a site license charging a price that increases with the number of users on the local network.
67. Stores purchase enough copies of a movie so that the wait is not too long before a patron
finds an available copy, and so that the copies do not depreciate too much from use. Assuming these
factors are independent of the kind of movie, then stores should have a constant ratio between the
number of copies of a movie and the expected number of renters for that movie. See Mortimer, supra
note 58, at 2 (noting that a third party aggregates the demand of independent video retailers and
"negotiates and monitors revenue-sharing agreements with movie distributors on their behalf").
68. Video rental stores are efficient distributors of the shared videotapes. Rental displaces much
of the less efficient resale market, though online auctions could improve the efficiency of resale.
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files, photographs, or movies probably vary enormously. There is potential
69
for a severe coalition diversity effect.

C. PRICE DISCRIMINATION

Price discrimination, the practice of charging different prices to
different buyers of the same product, is common in markets for copyrighted
works. 70 Sharing can increase profit by facilitating price discrimination and
decrease profit by disrupting price discrimination. Sharing hurts profit by
allowing buyers to arbitrage against types of price discrimination that are
not connected to the act of sharing. Specifically, sharing can bring together
two different classes of buyers that the seller would like to keep separate
for the purpose of price discrimination. Software sellers often discriminate
between the academic and business markets, or between the home and
business markets. This sort of discrimination is less effective if business
71
users routinely share with academic or home users.
Price discrimination can ameliorate problems caused by the dispersion
arising from coalition diversity. Stan Liebowitz documents such price
discrimination in the market for academic journal subscriptions.7 2
Publishers discriminate between libraries and individual subscribers,
charging a higher price to libraries. 73 Liebowitz observes that the price
differential between the two markets jumped after libraries introduced
photocopiers.7 4 Publishers found they could offset the effect of
photocopying by increasing the differential in subscription prices between
libraries and individual subscribers.75
Software sellers do even better because they implement a more
sophisticated form of price discrimination called "site licensing." A site
license charges a fee that increases with the number of software users at a
69. The problem is aggravated by the difficulty the purchaser of an original file has appropriating
value from other members of the coalition. See infra Part I.D.
70. Price Discrimination,supra note 19, at 58-59.
71.
Similarly, the used book market interferes with the ability of book publishers to discriminate
between the markets for hard-bound and paperback books.
72. See Liebowitz, supranote 15, at 952-53.
73. Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, a leading publisher of medical journals, offers three
subscription prices: an institutional price, an individual subscriber price, and an "in-training" price. The
institutional price applies to libraries, hospitals, corporations, and partnerships of three or more people.
Lippincott
Williams
&
Wilkins,
United
States
(U.S.)
Pricing
Policy,
at
http://www.lww.comlstatic/customerservice/uspricing.html (last visited July 12, 2004).
74. Liebowitz, supra note 15, at 952-53.
75. Id. at 953.
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site, usually a local network.7 6 A site license eliminates the effect of
coalition diversity, and sharing coupled with a site license increases
profit." The aggregation effect still works to the benefit of the seller using
a site license. Large coalitions have more predictable valuations and so
profit is larger. Coalition diversity causes demand dispersion that hurts
profit under a uniform price, but the harm disappears when the coalitions
are charged different prices according to their size.
Consider an example. Suppose ten end-users all have a valuation of V
and they are grouped into four coalitions of size one, two, three, and four.
With no sharing the seller charges a price of V and earns 10V. With sharing
and uniform pricing the seller charges 3V and earns 6V. Profit falls because
the only effect is the coalition diversity effect. But given sharing and site
licensing, profit returns to 10V because the coalition diversity effect is
neutralized. The seller charges V to a single end-user, 2V to a pair of endusers, and 3V or 4V to the larger coalitions.78
Licenses similar to site licenses appear in other copyright protected
markets. Music performance licenses link license fees to factors such as the
size of a bar, the ticket revenue from a show, or the advertising revenue of
a radio or television station. Photocopying licenses link royalties to the
number of employees at a company. 79 Site licenses and similar forms of
price discrimination are greatly facilitated by the threat of a copyright suit.
76. See
Microsoft
Details
Pricing for
New
Customer
Software,
at
http://www.dotproject.org/news.php?action=read&id--468 (July 12, 2002) (explaining that Microsoft
offers the standard version of its Customer Relationship Management software at $395 per user plus
$995 for the server, and a more advanced version for $1395 per-user plus $1990 for the server).
77. This assumes that the cost of implementing this form of price discrimination is not too large.
78. If the seller does not know the pattern of sharing, then sharing increases dispersion. This
hurts profit under uniform pricing, and site licensing does not handle coalition diversity as well, but it
still increases profit over the case with no sharing. To understand why, suppose there are three
consumers with valuations of x < y < z. Suppose the optimal price when there is no sharing is x and
therefore profit is 3x. Suppose that any pair could share, and the seller does not care which pair is
formed, if any. A site license with a price of x for one unit and 2x for two units will give a profit of 3x,
and thus the seller is guaranteed a profit at least as big as the profit without sharing. It is likely the seller
will do better. Suppose for example that the valuations are 3, 4, and 5; there is a one-quarter probability
that any pair will share and a one-quarter probability of no sharing. Then a uniform price of 3 gives a
profit of 9 absent sharing. Optimal price discrimination calls for a price of 4 for one unit and a price of
7 for two units, which gives a profit of 9.25. This profit is obtained in the following manner: onequarter of the time there is no sharing and two units are sold at a price of 4; one-quarter of the time the
two high value users share and pay 7 for a two-person site license; and one-half of the time the lowvaluation consumer shares with one of the other two users, so a single unit is sold at a price of 4 and a
two person site license is sold at a price of 7. Hence 9.25 = (1/4)(2)(4) + (1/4)(7) + (1/2)(4+7).
79. The beneficial effect on profit from a photocopy license was mentioned above in the
discussion of transaction costs. See supra note 56.
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Fair use removes the threat of suit and makes it more difficult for sellers to
block arbitrage and get information about coalition size.
D. WILLINGNESS TO PAY

Sharing poses a particular threat to profit when authorized purchasers
do not appropriate (or otherwise account for) much of the value derived by
other users in a coalition.8 0 To understand this threat, recall the example in
Part I. I assumed potential users of some copyrighted work all had the same
valuation, V. Absent sharing, the seller sets a price of V and extracts a profit
of V per user. If the users all migrate into two-user coalitions and each
coalition fully accounts for the valuations of both members, then the seller
could set a price of 2V and earn a profit of V per user. In this case the seller
indirectly appropriates the entire surplus of both coalition members. At the
other extreme, the buyer for each coalition behaves as if she holds a
valuation equal to her personal valuation of V. Then the seller would fail to
indirectly appropriate any value from the second coalition member and the
seller would earn a profit of V/2 per user.
Several factors determine the degree to which a coalition purchaser
will account for the valuations held by other members of the coalition. In
coalitions of friends or family, purchasers care directly about the welfare of
each member, and so the coalition's valuation should be close to the sum of
the members' valuations.8 1 Likewise, institutions like firms probably
instruct purchasing agents to fully account for the valuations of all users in
the firm. Organizers of some coalitions appropriate value by charging other
coalition members.8 2 A loose-knit coalition that does not charge fees
normally creates a severe appropriability problem for the seller of the
80.
See Liebowitz, supra note 15, at 948. Limited appropriability cuts profit and diminishes the
productive incentive. This might be offset by the presence of strong network effects. See Kathleen
Reavis Conner & Richard P. Rumelt, Software Piracy: An Analysis of Protection Strategies, 37 MGMT.
Sc1. 125, 136 (1991); Lisa N. Takeyama, The Welfare Implications of Unauthorized Reproduction of
Intellectual Property in the Presence of Demand Network Externalities, 42 J. INDUS. ECON. 155, 165

(1994).
81.
In addition, sharing with friends and family can raise the direct utility of members of the
coalition. In the language of economics, a consumption externality applies to many copyrighted works
because people like to consume cultural products that other people are consuming. For examples of
economic models incorporating this preference, see Gary S. Becker, A Note on Restaurant Pricing and
Other Examples of Social Influences on Price, 99 J. POL. ECON. 1109 (1991), and Edi Kari & David
Schmeidler, Fixed Preferences and Changing Tastes, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 262 (1990).
82.
Since the organizer usually cannot capture all the consumer surplus of other coalition
members, fee-based coalitions have an aggregate valuation less than the sum of individual valuations.
See Liebowitz, supra note 15, at 947 (noting that buyers incorporate resale price into their valuations).
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copyrighted work. 83 The purchaser for a loose-knit coalition may have
have
difficulty discovering the valuations of other members and may not
84
purchase.
a
making
when
valuations
those
for
account
to
desire
any
The average willingness to pay falls because of appropriability
problems, but three other aspects of sharing tend to increase it. Sharing
may create network effects that increase willingness to pay and profit.
Software users often get more value from a product because it is used by
others. 85 Also, many consumers enjoy entertainment more if they can share
it with friends and family. 86 Additionally, sharing helps users avoid
negotiation and payment costs. For example, a teacher can avoid the cost of
transacting with a copyright owner by making a spontaneous photocopy
may be an effective marketing tool
from a school library. Finally, sharing
87
that increases demand and profit.
83. Kathleen Reavis Conner and Richard Rumelt attribute the indirect appropriability in Stanley
Besen and Stan Liebowitz to the assumption that copies can only be made from originals. Conner &
Rumelt, supra note 80, at 127. That assumption is not realistic for software or digital content; it may not
even be realistic for photocopied text or analogue tapes.
84. Lunney stresses that file-sharing on the Internet is subject to a severe free rider problem. See
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 824 (2001). See also John Markoff, Many Take, but
Few Give on Gnutella, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2000, at C4 (noting a survey of Gnutella users finding that
only 1% of users provided 40% of the files, and observing that Gnutella could be a target for a lawsuit).
For a general discussion of the problems with private provision of a public good, see Jordi Brandts &
Arthur Schram, Cooperation and Noise in Public Goods Experiments: Applying the Contribution
Function Approach, 79 J. PUB. ECON. 399 (2001); Charles Bram Cadsby & Elizabeth Maynes,
Voluntary Provision of Threshold Public Goods with Continuous Contributions: Experimental
Evidence, 71 J. PUB. ECON. 53 (1999); and Paul Pecorino, The Effect of Group Size on Public Good
Provision in a Repeated Game Setting, 72 J. PUB. ECON. 121 (1999).
Uncertainty about whether a buyer will share, or how many people she will share with, does not
necessarily create an appropriability problem. A rational buyer facing uncertainty would compute the
expected value from sharing and incorporate that into her valuation.
85. See Conner & Rumelt, supra note 80, at 133, 136 (noting that sharing may increase profit
because of network effects); Takeyama, supra note 80, at 165 (same); Oz Shy & Jacques-Franqois
Thisse, A Strategic Approach to Software Protection, 8 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 163, 178-79
(1999) (showing that a strong network effect causes duopolists to reject copy protection).
86. Lunney, supra note 14, at 1024 ("Consumers are more likely to seek and more likely to find
popular works when they engage in private copying because the enjoyment of copyrighted works
exhibits network externalities.").
87. See S.J. Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and PriceDiscrimination,in 8 RESEARCH
IN LAW AND ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS 181, 191 (John Palmer &
Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. eds., 1986) (observing that photocopying allows a researcher to sample journals in
the library, perhaps ultimately increasing the journals' sales); John Borland, Major Label Breaks FileTrading Boycott, CNETNews.com, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-246267.html?legacy=cnet (Sept.
26, 2000) (reporting that Capitol Records released video files for use on Aimster to promote a record
at
Music
Listeners,
Label
to
Target
Service,
Record
Online
release);
(Sept. 1, 2000)
http://partners.nytimes.comllibrary/tech/00/09/biztech/articles/0mp3-warner.html
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TABLE 1. Effect of sharing on profit

Costs to the
Copyright

Demand
Smoothing

Price
Willingness to
Discrimination 1
Pay

Aggregation
Effect

SieLcnig

Owner
Production
Increases
Profit
No
Effectoron

and
Distribution

Profit

Cost
Savings

Decreases
Profit

Self-help
Costs

Network
Effects,
Transaction
Costs

Coalition
Diversity

Appropriability
Problems

Table 1 summarizes the effects of sharing on profit. The four column
headings list factors that are important for an economic analysis of sharing.
Below each heading are entries indicating conditions that tend to increase
or decrease profit. The first row indicates sharing that tends to increase
profit by cutting production and distribution costs, smoothing demand
through the aggregation effect, creating an opportunity for site licensing,
and creating network effects. The second row indicates that sharing tends
to decrease profit by inducing greater self-help efforts, creating demand
dispersion through coalition diversity, causing arbitrage that undercuts
price discrimination, and reducing the average willingness to pay because
purchasers do not appropriate value from those with whom they share.
IV. HISTORICAL EVIDENCE OF THE IMPACT OF SHARING ON
PROFIT
Copyright protected industries have coped often with shocks caused
by the introduction of new forms of sharing. Each shock inevitably leads to
calls from copyright owners for control over the new form of sharing. The
calls are sometimes answered, sometimes not. New forms of sharing
generally create social value and increase total surplus, but there are
historical examples showing the opposite is possible. Music performance
on the radio, rental of recorded movies, and photocopying are three major
(reporting that Warner Music Group sends e-mail to MP3.com users to target its promotional
information).
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forms of sharing that have been integrated successfully into entertainment
and publishing markets. In contrast, software and music rental apparently
88
were too disruptive to be permitted in software and music markets.
A. MUSIC PERFORMANCE ON THE RADIO

The introduction of commercial radio broadcasts in the 1920s
facilitated large-scale, anonymous sharing of music. Radio broadcasts
posed a threat to the music industry comparable to the current threat posed
by digital file-sharing. 89 Radio performance displaced private performances
and related sales of sheet music and records. 90 The courts ruled that radio
performances were subject to the performance right, 9' and music copyright
owners gained control over radio performances through the enforcement
efforts of the American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers
("ASCAP").9 2
Radio broadcast of music surely has added to the profit of the music
industry. Today, the industry collects close to $1 billion in annual
performance licensing fees from radio, television, and other public
performances. 93 The factors in Table 1 help us understand the profit effect
of radio (and other public) performance. Although radio performance
displaced sales of sheet music and records, it created a strong demand for
records by radio stations. Stations have a high willingness to pay because
their advertising revenue reflects the number of listeners they attract. Thus
stations are willing to pay the most for music that attracts the most
listeners. This favorable effect is not undermined by the enormous coalition
diversity created by radio broadcasts. Price discrimination reverses the
effect of coalition diversity, and turns radio performance into a bonanza for
the music industry. Performance licenses link the size of the royalty
payment to factors like the advertising revenue of radio stations; these
measures are excellent proxies for the valuation each coalition attaches to
88. Videogame rental is an exception.
89. There were years of conflict between radio broadcasters and music copyright owners. See
Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275, 291-99 (1989).
90.

See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL

JUKEBOX 73 (1994).
91. Id. at 72.
92. After ASCAP won injunctions to block public performances, "radio stations and motion
picture theatre owners went to Congress to seek ASCAP's abolition." Litman, supra note 89, at 293.
Today ASCAP and Broadcast Music, Inc. are the main sources of public performance licenses. Besides
radio stations, they also license television networks and stations, bars, restaurants, and others.
93. Lydia Pallas Loren, Paying the Piper, 3 J. SMALL& EMERGING BUS. L. 231, 233 n.2 (1999).
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public performance of music. 94 The performance right allows music

copyright owners to implement extremely fine-grained price discrimination
through public performance licenses that work analogously to site
licenses. 95 Finally, radio performance became a powerful advertising tool
that increased the willingness to pay of people who continued to buy
96
records and sheet music.

B. MUSIC, SOFTWARE, AND VIDEO RENTAL
The first sale doctrine gives buyers the right to lend a copyrighted
work at no charge (like library books) and even to lend a work for a fee
(like videotapes and DVDs). Music rental stores made a brief appearance in
the United States when cassette tapes were introduced. 97 The stores offered
records for rent and sold blank cassette tapes. Unsurprisingly, most
customers copied the rented records onto cassettes. The music rental
business halted after Congress passed the Record Rental Amendment,
which gives music copyright owners control over commercial music rental.
Software publishers acted in advance of widespread software rental and
copying to obtain the Software Rental Amendment, which parallels the
Record Rental Amendment. 98 Surprisingly, movie copyright owners failed
in their attempt to obtain similar protection from Congress.99 The contrast

is puzzling because the movie industry made arguments similar to those
gaining
advanced by the music and software industries, and it succeeded in100
countries.
European
many
in
rental
video
prohibition of commercial
94. Price Discrimination,supra note 19, at 111.
95. Id.at10-11.
96. See To Amend the Copyright Act: Hearings on S. 2600 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Comm. on Patents,68th Cong. 31-32 (1924) (statement of Charles H. Tuttle).
97. Record rental stores in 1984 rented records at rates ranging from $0.99 to $2.50 per record.
ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT 554 (5th ed. 1999).
98. Recorded music cannot be rented without permission from the copyright owner. Record
Rental Amendment of 1984, 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(l)(A) (2000). The Computer Software Rental
Amendment Act of 1990 prohibits unauthorized rental of many types of software. Id.
99. The movie industry tried to block video rental stores with a proposal comparable to the
Record Rental Amendment. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §

8.12[BI[7] (2003); Robert A. Rosenbloum, The Rental Rights Directive:A Step in the Right and Wrong
Directions, 15 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 547, 578 (1995) (discussing how the movie industry lobbied for
but failed to get a video rental right in the United States).
100. See Case 158/86, Warner Bros. Inc. v. Christiansen, 1988 E.C.R. 2605, para. 5 (1988) (noting
that Danish copyright law precludes unauthorized video rental), WL 1988 E.C.R. 2605 (EU), Celex No.
686J0158; Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The WTO, TRIPS,
International IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 333, 366-67 (2000);
Rosenbloum, supra note 99, at 571 (noting the European Union's ("EU") Rental Rights Directive gives
a copyright owner the exclusive fight to authorize lending of sound and video recordings).
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Some commentators have mischaracterized the Record and Software
Rental Amendments as a response to piracy. Piracy was, and continues to
be, a serious problem for both industries, but rented music and software are
10 1
unlikely to be an important source of original content for pirates.
Regardless of whether rental copies are available, pirates are apt to buy or
steal their source material, not rent it. The real concern of the music and
software industry was small-scale widespread, copying of rental works-in
other words, sharing. Likewise, the movie industry argued (less plausibly)
that rental would lead to piracy. But the real interest of the movie industry
was, and still is, control over sharing made possible by video rental.
The puzzle about the different treatment of video can be resolved by
understanding the impact of rental on profit in the music, software, and
movie industries. The starting point is the observation that the music,
software, and video rental markets significantly depress sales to end users
(the lost sales problem), but copyright owners have a chance to recover the
lost profit by charging a high price on sales to rental store owners. The net
profit effect of sharing depends on these and the other factors discussed in
Part III. There are two critical differences between movie rental on one
hand and software and music rental on the other. Rental hurts sellers in the
latter two markets because it increases demand dispersion and causes
appropriability problems. 10 2 Software rental would create a serious problem
with coalition diversity assuming rental stores varied in size and success.
Demand for movie rental is concentrated in a small time interval close to
the rental release date, so large and successful video rental stores purchase
0 3
If
a large number of tapes roughly proportional to their rental volume.
that pattern does not carry over to software, then the number of users that
software rental stores expect to rent each copy of software to may vary
101.
Similarly, video pirates probably do not make copies from rented videos or DVDs.
102.
Private lending is distinguished from commercial lending in the Record and Software Rental
Amendments. Private lending and copying might decrease demand dispersion through the aggregation
effect. There is a nonprofit exemption to the Record Rental Amendment and the Software Rental
Amendments. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A) (2000). Furthermore, limitations on the scope of the Software
Rental Amendments probably protect lending of software to friends. Ihe first sale restriction does not
apply when sharing produces no direct or indirect commercial gain. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 99, § 8.12[B][8][a] ("[A]n owner of a piece of software can continue to lend the diskette on which
it is embodied to friends without great fear of liability.").
103.
See James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn E. Spier, Revenue Sharing and Vertical Control in the
Video Rental Industry, 49 J. INDUS. ECON. 223, 227 (2001) (suggesting that movie rental demand is
concentrated close to the rental release date); Mortimer, supra note 58, at 54-59 (showing that the
average number of copies purchased by a store under a linear-pricing scheme is about thirteen for the
highest grossing movies, six for the mid-level grossing movies, and two for the lowest grossing movies,
and that the average number of rentals of videos purchased under a fixed fee scheme is about twenty to
thirty per tape).
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considerably. Variation in rental revenue 1 4translates into variation in
willingness to pay for copies of the software.
Software and music rental present an appropriability problem because
of serial copying. A rental store appropriates value by collecting fees from
renters. Renters who initiate a chain of serial copying are unlikely to
appropriate much of the value they create, and so rental fees will fall
significantly short of the social value associated with rentals. This
appropriability problem could significantly cut profit to the software and
music industries.10 5 The movie industry has been successful in thwarting
serial copying by using copy-protection technology,10 6 and because the
07
quality of a serial copy of analogue videotape degrades rapidly. 1
In contrast to music and software rental, video rental is extremely
profitable for copyright owners. 10 8 The sharing made possible by movie
rental smoothes demand. Rental does not lead to much coalition diversity
because each rental store has an incentive to manage its inventory of
videotapes so that each tape is used roughly the same number of times.
Thus the revenue appropriated from each tape at each store should be about
the same. Furthermore, heterogeneity in the valuations of renters is
smoothed via the aggregation effect. 09
European nations that prohibit unauthorized video rental still have
video rental stores. We can be confident that if a Video Rental Amendment
104. Music rental is probably similar to movie rental regarding its impact on demand dispersion.
105. Section 109(b)(l)(B)(ii) of the Software Rental Amendments Act excludes videogames used
with videogame consoles; thus videogames are available for rental at video stores. 17 U.S.C. §
109(b)(1)(B)(ii). The appropriability problem might not be severe in this market because of relatively
tough copy-prevention technology embedded in videogame consoles.
106. Macrovision Corporation produces copy-prevention technology that distorts picture quality
in copies made from videotapes, DVDs, and pay-per-view movies. Video Copy Protection, at
http://www.macrovision.com/products/video/index.shtml (last visited July 14, 2004).
107. One reason the Video Rental Amendment was defeated was that relatively few video rental
customers copy the rented tapes. See Rosenbloum, supra note 99, at 571, 578 (noting the EU's Rental
Rights Directive was designed to eliminate copying attributable to audio and video rental).
108. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2003) (observing that the
video rental market has become "[a]n enormous new market" for the movie industry), cert. denied, 124
S. Ct. 1069 (2004); Richard Roehl & Hal R. Varian, supra note 58, at 11-16 (finding that the practice
of 18th century English circulating libraries of books was economically similar to modem video rental
stores; book publishers and movie studios both feared the emergence of rental stores, but in the end
both
clearly
benefited);
The
Monster
that
Ate
Hollywood,
at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/hollywood/business/windows.html (last visited July
15, 2004) [hereinafter Monster that Ate Hollywood] ("[Gilobal box office accounts for only 26% of the
total wholesale revenues for a film released today. Worldwide video rentals and sales, in contrast, now
account for 46%.").
109. Varian shows that the existence of a rental market may lead to profitable segmentation of
users; high value users purchase and low value users rent. Varian, supra note 19, at 486.
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had passed in the United States, rental would likewise be permitted. The
main difference would likely be price discrimination in the video sales
market between home users and video stores.11 0 Video sales and rental are
both important sources of revenue to the movie industry."' The industry
faces a difficult choice when setting a price for sales. The price should be
high to capture surplus from rental stores, but it should not be so high that
it discourages purchases by home users. Hollywood initially attempted to
discriminate in the sales price to home users and rental stores in the United
States without the benefit of copyright control over rental; the attempt
failed. 1 2 With the aid of the law the movie industry would cut the home
sales price and (indirectly) raise the home rental price. 1 3 The increase in
rental prices might cut total surplus because some renters would exit the
market.11 4 On the other hand, total surplus might grow because of increased
consumer video sales resulting from the lower price.11 5 Taking a broader
110. The European Court of Justice faced a conflict between the first sale doctrine and the video
lending right in a case in which a defendant imported videotapes from England for rental in Denmark.
See Case 158/86, Warner Bros. Inc. v. Christiansen, 1988 E.C.R. 2605, para. 5 (1988) (noting that
Danish copyright law precludes unauthorized video rental), WL 1988 E.C.R. 2605 (EU), Celex No.
686J0158. The Court favored the lending right and so promoted price discrimination. See id. See also
Rosenbloum, supra note 99, at 566 (noting that a rental right facilitates price discrimination by
separating the markets for video sales and rental). Perhaps some form of site license should be charged
to rental stores, but there would not be much need for a site license if there really is little coalition
diversity. The revenue-sharing described below has a similar effect to site licensing, but it is motivated
by concerns about achieving an optimal inventory of videotapes in rental stores, not concerns about
heterogeneity among stores. See Mortimer, supra note 58, at 8-12. The movie industry discriminates
among video rental stores by including minimum and maximum inventory requirements in revenuesharing contracts. Id. at 37.
111.
In 1999 over half of the film-related domestic revenue of movie studios came from video
rentals and sales. Dana & Spier, supra note 103, at 226. Rentals generated $8.1 billion and sales
generated $9.2 billion of domestic retail revenue. Id. at 226 & n.9; Mortimer, supra note 58, at 5
(pointing out that in 1999, home video accounted for 55% of the domestic revenue for movie studios);
Rosenbloum, supra note 99, at 565 (noting that the revenue to the movie industry from videotape
rentals versus sales is almost the same).
112. See Roehl & Varian, supra note 58 (recounting that in the early 1980s movie producers
experimented with price discrimination in which a high price was charged to rental stores and a lower
price to consumers, but that they abandoned the practice by 1983).
113. See Julie Holland Mortimer, Price Discrimination and Copyright Law: Evidence from the
Introduction
of
DVDs
1-3
(May
3,
2004)
(unpublished
manuscript,
at
http://mortimer.fas.harvard.edu/04dvd503.pdf).
114. Most of the marginal renters who exit the market will probably shift to viewing the movie in
some other format such as cable or broadcast television. Thus the social cost is mainly delayed viewing,
rather than lost viewing. See Rosenbloum, supra note 99, at 580 (arguing that the industry and
videotape purchasers gain from a rental right and renters lose).
115. And, of course, industry profit would rise. Id. at 564-65 (pointing out that since the sales
market is fairly large, it is difficult to capture the value of rentals). See generally Mortimer, supra note
58 (providing evidence that revenue-sharing leads to the purchase of about twice as many tapes but
rental activity is about the same).
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perspective one can argue that Hollywood could use a Video Rental
Amendment along with the public performance right to implement finegrained price discrimination that would increase total surplus.
The comparison might now be moot because of a contractual
innovation in the video rental market 1 6 In recent years, the movie industry
has developed a revenue-sharing arrangement between the studios and the
rental stores. 117 Rental stores are charged a very low price for each
videotape but they are required to share the rental revenue from each tape
with the studios. 118 The new contracts were made possible by new
monitoring technology that cut the cost and risk of deception associated
with revenue-sharing. 119 The goal of the contracts is to increase the
inventory of videotapes held by rental stores.1 20 A side benefit to the
studios is that they are now free to charge a price for home videotape (and
DVD) sales that is independent of the sale price to rental stores. Therefore,
the movie industry has gained by other means the benefit it sought through
a Video Rental Amendment.
C. PHOTOCOPIERS

The role of photocopying in the publishing industry parallels the role
of file-sharing in the music industry. Both technologies facilitate sharing
116. Even greater changes are on the horizon as Internet delivery of movies could make rental
stores obsolete. See Barnaby J. Feder, LB.M. to Run a Venture to Rent Films over the Web, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 9, 2002, at C6 (reporting that five movie studios set up a joint venture to deliver movies to
consumers over the Internet for one-day rental).
117. Empirical evidence indicates that the combined profit of video sellers and rental stores
increased by about 3-6% from the adoption of revenue-sharing contracts, and consumers benefited
substantially. See Mortimer, supra note 58, at 38. The cost for a videotape under a fixed fee contract in
1998 was about $70. Hal R. Varian, With Evolving Technology, Good Monitors Make for Better
Contracts, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2001, at C2. Movie distributors switched from charging about $70 per
videotape to charging an upfront fee of $3 to $8 plus a 40-60% share of rental fees. Id. This change
raised the combined profit of movie distributors and rental stores by 7%. Such contracts only became
feasible when networked computer technology reduced monitoring costs to a low level. Id. See also
Disney Sues Blockbuster over Contract, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2003, at C2 (revealing that Blockbuster
used to purchase videos for about $65 each and keep all the rental revenue, but that under a new
contract Blockbuster pays Disney $7 a copy plus a share of the rental revenue).
118. See Mortimer, supra note 58, at 1-2 (relating that revenue-sharing contracts became popular
in 1998, and they charged an upfront fee between $0 and $8, with the retailer keeping between 40-60%
of the rental revenue); Roehl & Varian, supra note 58 (noting that by 1998 a new type of discrimination
arose by which the store pays a fixed fee between $2 and $4 plus 40% of the rental revenue, and that
this new practice allows Blockbuster to guarantee a video is in stock).
119. See Disney Sues Blockbuster over Contract, supra note 117 (reporting that Disney sued
Blockbuster to recover $120 million from a four-year agreement to share rental fees on videos and
accused it of improper accounting and selling videos prematurely).
120. See Dana & Spier, supra note 103, at 233.
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via personal copying; both enable lawful and infringing copying; and both
have been used by profit-making enterprises that have been reasonably
described as piratical by some and lawful by others. Copyright law
allocates the right to control certain uses of photocopiers to copyright
owners and allows other uses without permission. Diane Zimmerman finds
little evidence that photocopying significantly harms the profits of journal
publishers:
[T]he claim that lack of permission fees for photocopying would
decimate the publishing industry was not born out by experience.
Photocopying came into widespread use in the early 1960s, and it was at
least three decades before owners could begin to collect any significant
revenues for it. But the publishing
industry did not wither away and
12 1
authors did not cease to write.
Photocopying has three positive effects on profit. First, it reduces
costs because photocopying journal articles is probably more efficient than
producing and distributing a new journal, especially if a user only wants a
few of the articles in a journal. 1 22 Second, it increases libraries' willingness
to pay, assuming they account for the benefit to users who avoid
transaction costs (such as teachers making a spontaneous copy for
classroom use). Third, publishers profit by price discriminating between
libraries and individual subscribers. Liebowitz found that only 8% of
academic journals in his sample price discriminated between libraries and
individuals in 1959-the year Xerox introduced its 914 copier-but 74% of
them did by 1983.123 Price discrimination allows publishers to capture
some of the value created by library photocopying. Liebowitz found
evidence that library subscription prices escalated faster than individual
subscription prices, which is consistent with a price response to increased
1 24
photocopying of journals owned by libraries.
These positive effects were offset by increased coalition diversity
created by systematic photocopying. Course pack photocopies and in-house
121. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, A Lesson for the Digital Future from the Old Media:
Photocopying, Journal Pricing and Their Impact on the Enterprise of Scholarship and Research para. 15
(unpublished manuscript, at http://www.law.nyu.edu/ilii/conferences (last visited July 16, 2004)). Cf
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1354 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (holding that the plaintiffpublisher did not show economic harm from photocopying), affd by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S.
376 (1975) (per curiam).
122. See Bakos et al., supra note 19, at 1 8-19.
123. See Liebowitz, supra note 15, at 952.
124. See id. This evidence would be stronger if it were linked to profits. Profits could have fallen
if there were significant lost sales.
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125
copying by corporate users creates coalition diversity that harms profit.
The potential harm to profit from systematic photocopying was eliminated
by cases that rejected the fair use defense as applied to course packs and
corporate in-house photocopying. 126 These cases created a market for
photocopying licenses that facilitates a form of price discrimination, which
has an effect comparable to software site licensing and music performance
127
licensing.

Historical evidence suggests that sharing usually increases the profit
of copyright owners. The evidence is clear in the cases of movie rental and
radio performance. Copyright owners control radio performance of music
and can prohibit it. The fact that they license performance shows that it
increases profit. Similarly, copyright owners control movie rental in many
countries, where they authorize it and profit from it. Copyright owners
control the use of photocopiers for course packs and for corporate
reproduction of copyrighted texts. They license and profit from these uses.
In contrast, it is clear that music and software rental reduce profit;
copyright owners have not allowed these forms of sharing in the United
States or anywhere else in the world. The impact of unregulated sharing on
profit is less clear, but it seems quite likely that Hollywood has profited
from movie rental in the United States even though rental businesses
operate without permission from copyright owners. Little evidence exists
indicating the effect of unregulated photocopying on profit; it might be
positive, and if it has been negative, it does not seem to have been too
significant. This leaves an important, unanswered question: how much
more profit could copyright owners get if they had the right to control
128
movie rental and all forms of photocopier use?
125. See Television Digest, Inc. v. United States Tel. Ass'n, 841 F. Supp. 5, 10-11 (D.D.C. 1993)
(stating that corporate photocopying of a newsletter harms the market for that newsletter); Pasha
Publ'ns, Inc. v. Enmark Gas Corp., No. 3-92-CV0027-G, 1992 WL 70786, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 10,
1992) (same); Jane C. Ginsburg, Reproduction of Protected Works for University Research or
Teaching, 39 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 181, 183 (1992) (noting that publishers will raise prices in
response to photocopying because subscribers buy an "original, plus an indeterminate number of
additional copies").
126. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1390-91 (6th Cir.
1996) (en bane); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 931 (2d Cir. 1994); Marcus v.
Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 1983); Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F.
Supp. 1522, 1529-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
127. See infra text accompanying notes 155-61.
128. Revenue-sharing between Hollywood and movie rental stores provides evidence of the effect
of the law.
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V. FAIR USE ANALYSIS OF SHARING
Sharing should be permitted under the fair use doctrine when it
129
increases total surplus without harming productive incentives too much.
Courts should use the methods developed in Parts III and IV to assess the
effect of sharing on profit and, ultimately, productive incentives. Part V
explains when fair use is likely to increase consumer surplus more than it
decreases profit. It also shows that courts often follow my approach
intuitively when they balance the fair use factors.
Sharing affects total surplus ex post 1 30 through its direct effects on
usage and cost, and through its indirect effects on prices, enforcement and
self-help. Normally, sharing increases usage, but not always. An obvious
social gain occurs when a potential user who previously was excluded from
the market gets to use a copyrighted work through sharing. A potential user
could have been excluded because of the high cost of transacting with the
seller or simply because the price was higher than her valuation. This social
benefit from sharing can be reversed if the seller responds to sharing with a
price increase large enough to offset the increase in consumption brought
about by sharing.' 3 1 To illustrate, recall the example in Part III.B with three
potential users of a copyrighted work: X and Y have valuations of 3 and Z
has a valuation of 5. With no sharing, the price is 3, profit is 9, and total
surplus is 11. Suppose X and Z share a copy of the work and Y acts alone.
The seller would raise the price from 3 to 8, X and Z would share one unit,
129. Recall that this is a sufficient but not necessary condition for fair use to increase expected
social welfare. See supra note 37.
130. 1measure social value as the ex post total surplus arising in a market for a copyrighted work.
Given the assumption that marginal cost is zero, total surplus is simply the sum of the valuations of
potential end-users who actually consume, minus the costs of sharing and transaction costs. In general,
total surplus is defined as the sum of profit and consumer surplus. Ex ante total surplus is lower because
it accounts for the fixed cost of production.
131. Interestingly, a seller will sometimes cut the price in response to sharing instead of increasing
the price. Such a price cut amplifies the favorable effect of sharing on diffusion. The intuition behind
the price cut is that sharing sometimes gives buyers countervailing market power. The theory of
countervailing power states that total output and total surplus will rise in a monopoly market if the
buyers organize and confront the seller with their own bargaining power. The theory is not well
developed, but it holds out the possibility that bilateral bargaining between a single seller and a single
buyer will lead the parties to choose an efficient output level. The theory goes on to suggest that output
moves closer to the efficient level as buyers gain market power. See generally Ingela Alger, Consumer
Strategies Limiting the Monopolist's Power: Multiple and Joint Purchases, 30 RAND J. ECON. 736
(1999) (analyzing the profit effect of consumer sharing in a model of monopoly price discrimination).
Varian shows that if consumers are identical, then sharing creates market power for buyers. The threat
of sharing forces the sale price down even when there is no equilibrium sharing. Thus sharing creates
countervailing market power that disrupts rent extraction. See Varian, supra note 19, at 479-80. For
applications to fair use, see infra text accompanying notes 190-95.
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and Y would be priced out of the market.132 Profit falls from 9 to 8, and
total surplus falls even more-from 11 to 8.
Total surplus also depends on the mix of costs incurred and avoided
because of sharing. Sharing raises total surplus when it allows some users
to avoid the costs of negotiation and payment. Both site licensing and
unauthorized sharing reduce transaction costs by limiting the burden of
getting permission and making payment for the single party who makes a
purchase for a coalition. Sharing also saves the seller the cost of producing
and distributing to users who do not make a purchase. But those savings are
offset by the costs of sharing. There are costs to organize a coalition, the
costs to copy or transfer, and costs because the process of sharing may
delay consumption or degrade quality. Finally, sellers incur costs when
they try to discourage sharing through enforcement or self-help measures
like copy-control technology. If the sum of these sharing costs is greater
than the sum of costs avoided by sharing, then total surplus is adversely
affected.
The fair use defense 33 fine-tunes the balance between the
exclusionary powers given to the copyright owner and the social interest in
access to information and diffusion of copyrighted works. 134 Section 107 of
the Copyright Act codifies an open-ended balancing test that relies
primarily on four factors:
(I) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
132. A site license restores total surplus to the level that was attained when there was no sharing.
The price to a single user would be 3 and the price to a pair of users would be 6 for a total of 9; thus all
three consumers participate in the market. The seller cannot push the two-user license price above 6,
because X and Z can each purchase a one-user license at a price of 3. This illustrates the constraining
effect of the assumption that the seller cannot identify buyers. If the seller could identify Z as the buyer
with a valuation of 5, then the company would directly charge him 5 if he chose a one-user license.
Judge Easterbrook makes a similar point in ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir.
1996), when he considers what would happen if buyers all appeared before a seller with their valuations
stamped on their forehead.
133. There is some controversy about whether fair use is a defense or instead a limitation on the
scope of rights of the copyright owner. Compare Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,
590 (1994) (stating that fair use is an affirmative defense), and Lunney, supra note 14, at 987-88, with
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 567 (1985) (suggesting that the
copyright owner has the burden of proving a use was not fair), and Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,433-34 (1984) (same).
134. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1109-10
(1990); Loren, supra note 21, at 4; Lunney, supra note 14, at 998-99 (advocating a social welfare
approach to fair use that balances the social benefit from prohibiting a use against the social benefit
from permitting the use).
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portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work. 135

A subset of fair use cases feature sharing enabled by small-scale
reproduction. Many cases involve photocopying of text for research or
educational purposes.1 36 Other leading cases involve taping or computer
copying of music and movies.1 37 Fair use analysis of sharing concentrates
on the first and fourth factors. Usually, the defendant copies the whole
work and the parties do not contest the third factor.' 3 8 The second factor is
important but usually not contested either. If the subject matter is a highly
expressive work like a movie or music, however, then the copyright owner
is accorded more deference.' 39 If the subject matter is a less expressive
140
work like a scientific publication, then the case for fair use is enhanced.
Fair use accounts for the effect of sharing on productive incentives
through the second and fourth factors. Courts assess the impact of sharing
on the profit of the copyright owner through the market effect factor, and
they assess the effect of profit on productive incentives by considering the
nature of the work. Copyright law assumes (without much empirical
support or normative justification 14 1) that highly expressive works should
enjoy greater fair use protection and thus a stronger profit-based incentive.
Courts implicitly determine whether private and social incentives are
misaligned by using the first factor to privilege certain uses. In Sony Corp.
of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Supreme Court rejected the

view that only transformative uses may qualify for fair use.' 4 2 Below, I
135. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
136. See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 915 (2d Cir. 1994); Williams
& Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1348 (Ct. C1. 1973), affd by an equally divided Court
420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam).
137. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091, 1095 (9th Cir. 2002); In re
Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 641 (N.D. 11.2002), affd, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003),
cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1064 (2004).

138.

See Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-50 (discounting the importance of the third factor in a sharing

case).

139. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985).
140. See Stewart, 495 U.S. at 237; Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 563.
141.
Cf Fisher, supra note 18, at 1719-22 (developing an economic approach to categorizing
works for fair use analysis).
142. Both the Ninth Circuit in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 659 F.2d
963, 970 (9th Cir. 1981), and the dissent in Sony, 464 U.S. at 479-82 (Blackmun, J., dissenting),
expressed doubt that the fair use doctrine has much of a role in promoting purely private consumption.
The majority rejected this view and allowed fair use simply to expand consumption opportunities. See
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explain why spontaneous, personal, noncommercial, and research uses
make sharing more likely to be a fair use, and I identify new reasons why
certain kinds of sharing should qualify for fair use. 143
Fair use regulates sharing by shaping the market for copyrighted
works. Figure 1 displays the effect of fair use on photocopying and the
market for academic journals.144 The box on the left represents a copyright
owner, and the rest of the boxes represent users. The arrows indicate
distribution paths. The copyright owner can demand a payment from users
listed in regular font, but cannot use copyright law to back up a demand for
payment from users in italic font. The journal publisher sells journals to
corporate libraries, academic libraries, and individual subscribers. Patrons
of the corporate library photocopy journal articles for research purposes.
Patrons of the academic library photocopy articles for research and
teaching purposes. Some teachers make spontaneous copies for immediate
classroom use, and others make systematic copies for use in course packs.
Finally, some patrons of both libraries borrow the journal simply to read it.
The students are beyond the reach of copyright law because buying and
reading the text does not violate any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner. Likewise, the patrons who borrow and read the journal do not
violate any copyright rights. Parts V.A and V.B explain when
photocopying violates the reproduction right, and when it is fair use
instead. Figure 1 highlights the way fair use and copyright law generally
determine whether copyright owners can reach down the stream of
commerce and negotiate directly with users, or whether they must be
content to negotiate with intermediaries.
Sony, 464 U.S. at 450 n.33. See also Lunney, supra note 14, at 977 ("Merely increasing access to a
work, even unauthorized access, represents a sufficient public interest to invoke the fair use doctrine.").
143. Judicial innovation in fair use doctrine is common and easy to justify. "[E]ach of [the four]
factors taken alone is defined in only the most general terms, so that the courts are left with almost
complete discretion in determining whether any given factor is present in any particular
case." 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 99, § 13.05[A]. Also, the list of factors is illustrative and not
exhaustive. See Castle Rock Entm't v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 1998).
144. More precisely, photocopying is governed by fair use and 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2000), a statutory
complement to fair use that applies to public libraries. Also, Figure 1 contains an example governed by
the first sale doctrine found in § 109.
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FIGURE 1. Copyright law and pathways for sharing a journal article

A.

SPONTANEOUS AND SYSTEMATIC USES

Courts properly distinguish between spontaneous and systematic uses
when they apply the fair use doctrine. They recognize that spontaneous
uses usually have little impact on copyright owners' profit and in aggregate
provide significant social benefit. Typical spontaneous uses include last
minute copies of music, video, or text by teachers for class, and
photocopying by library patrons as a substitute for note-taking. Typical
systematic uses include photocopying of newsletters and journal articles by
firms and photocopying for university course packs. Courts favor
spontaneous uses because of relatively high transaction costs 145 and
145. For example, spontaneous photocopying for classroom use is fair use according to guidelines
negotiated by members of affected interested groups about the time the Copyright Act was revised in
1976. The guidelines were intended to set minimum levels of noninfringing classroom copying and
were included in a House Report on the revised copyright statute, but not in the statute itself.
See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 99, § 13.05[EI[3][a]. The guidelines suggest that one photocopy
for each student is a fair use if the copy is brief, done spontaneously, and the teacher does not engage in
more than nine instances of multiple photocopying during any one class term. Agreement on Guidelines
for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educational Institutions with respect to Books and Periodicals,
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disfavor systematic uses because of relatively low transaction costs., 4 6 The
logic behind this distinction is sound, but I will show there are other
reasons to distinguish spontaneous from systematic uses.
The following example illustrates the transaction cost logic. Suppose
teacher X finds an article in the newspaper one morning and makes copies
for use in class later that day. Sharing the article with the class produces a
net benefit (in excess of the copying cost) of 6. Suppose teachers Y and Z
clipped the same article and copy it every year for their classes. Their
classes get the same net benefit of 6. Copyright law applies fair use to the
spontaneous copying by X, but not the systematic copying by Y and Z.
Suppose Y and Z incur transaction costs of 1 to get an annual photocopy
license. The publisher will set the annual license fee at 5 to maximize
profit. Licenses to Y and Z generate a profit of 10. Total surplus is 16, the
47
value of all three uses minus the transaction costs incurred by Y and Z.1
Now suppose X's copying is not fair use, and X would incur a
transaction cost of 3 to get permission to make the copies. X's transaction
costs are likely to be higher because of the need to get permission in a
hurry and because Y and Z repeat the transaction each year. Assuming the
copyright owner cannot distinguish spontaneous from systematic uses at a
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68-69 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5682-83. The
guidelines do not apply to "consumable" works like workbooks, and they do not apply to copying that
substitutes for the purchase of a work. Id. at 69. See also Ginsburg, supra note 125, at 185 (relating that
the Berne Convention allows exemptions from the reproduction right for university research and
teaching). Also, classroom performance of a copyrighted work is exempted from the public
performance right. 17 U.S.C. § 110(2). See also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1390-91 (6th
Cir. 1996) (en banc) (discussing how the "systematic" nature of course pack copying works against a
finding of fair use); Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 1983) (explaining that it is not
a fair use when a teacher makes multiple photocopies for multiple classes); Basic Books, Inc. v.
Kinko's Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1526 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Public libraries get a limited
copyright exemption for certain photocopy-related activities but the exemption does not apply to course
packs. See 17 U.S.C. § 108.
Systematic videotaping also does not qualify for fair use. See Encyclopedia Britannica Educ.
Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp. 1156, 1158-59, 1179 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (denying the fair use defense to a
nonprofit organization engaged in systematic videotaping of educational programs for distribution to a
public school system); Betamax, supra note 8, at 1629 (arguing that systematic and centralized
videotape copying of educational programs is not a fair use because the benefit to users is high relative
to transaction costs).
147. Notice that 2 units of total surplus are lost because Yand Z each incur transaction costs of 1.
If all photocopying were fair use, then total surplus would rise to 18, but the 10 units of profit would be
lost. Fair use should apply to marginal cases in which a buyer is willing to transact despite incurring a
transaction cost that is large relative to the sale price. The loss in total surplus attributable to the
transaction cost may outweigh the incentive effect created by the profit from the transaction. See Price
Discrimination,supra note 19, at 109, 116.
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reasonable cost, it would maintain the same license fee of 5 and earn the
same profit of 10, and total surplus falls to 10. X does not license at a price
of 5 and would only license at prices less than or equal to 3 = 6 - 3. A
license fee of 3 is not attractive to the publisher because it would yield a
profit of 9. In this example, fair use does not harm the publisher's profit
because no licensing revenue is lost. But fair use raises social welfare
because it allows X to share the article with his class.
This transaction cost theory in favor of fair use faces mounting
challenges on two fronts. First, several commentators have observed that
costs associated with gaining permission and making payment are declining
in many markets because of the Internet and related developments.' 48 As
these transaction costs decline one justification for fair use and similar
doctrines slips away. If the transaction costs between X and the seller
vanish, then the seller's profit would grow from 10 to 15, total surplus
would still be 16, and the case for fair use disappears. Second, some courts
and commentators worry that fair use discourages the development of
licensing markets. 149 The potential profit available from high transaction
cost users provides a potent incentive for the seller or some third party to
150
create a market with lower transaction costs.
The two-fold case against fair use is strong, but not as strong as some
think. The prospect of a world without transaction costs seems remote.
Micropayments and Internet delivery of digital content have not been
adopted as quickly as some predicted. 5 ' Furthermore, eliminating
148.

See Tom W. Bell, Fair Use Vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on

Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 565-66 (1998); Merges, supra note 21, at 130
("[B]ecause the contemporary fair use doctrine is predicated on a market failure rationale, and because
an electronic exchange potentially eliminates this market failure for digital content, fair use law will
significant[ly] shrink, or an alternative basis for fair use will be rediscovered.").
149. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1994); Richard P.
Adelstein & Steven I. Peretz, The Competition of Technologies in Markets for Ideas: Copyright and

Fair Use in Evolutionary Perspective, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 209 (1985) (arguing that markets will
find a way to overcome high transaction costs); Betamax, supra note 8, at 1619 (arguing that the fair use
doctrine should be interpreted so as to "avoid the danger of making otherwise curable market failures
permanent through the grant of fair use"); Robert P. Merges, Of PropertyRules, Coase, and Intellectual
Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2655 (1994) (arguing that property rules give industry participants
an incentive to invest in institutions that reduce transaction costs); Merges, supra note 21, at 131
(arguing that the fair use doctrine might discourage the development of institutions that encourage
licensing by reducing transaction costs).
150. Internet-based licensing might reduce X's transaction costs to 1.
151.
See Jane Kaufman Winn, Clash of the Titans: Regulating the Competition Between
Establishedand Emerging Payment Systems, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 675, 691-702 (1999).
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1 52
contracting and payment costs does not eliminate transaction costs.
Many teachers and library patrons would make unauthorized photocopies
unless there was a credible threat of enforcement, but direct enforcement
costs could be prohibitively high. A suit against a school or library for
indirect infringement would be more effective, assuming the library safe
harbor contained in § 108 of the Copyright Act gets repealed in a
hypothetical world with no contracting and payment costs.1 53 Schools and
libraries would monitor photocopier usage or remove photocopiers so they
would not be liable for indirect copyright infringement. The final result
likely would be less spontaneous photocopying, burdensome enforcement
costs for schools and libraries, and not much additional profit for copyright
owners. Good copyright policy should acknowledge the costs of creating a
new licensing market; it should be especially wary of imposing
1 54
enforcement costs on third parties to encourage new markets.

Systematic photocopying creates fewer enforcement problems than
spontaneous photocopying. It is more visible and the stakes are higher,
which makes direct enforcement more likely. It is also less costly for
libraries and schools to monitor, and their monitoring costs drop
155
significantly when they accept a blanket photocopying license.
Corporate libraries generally get licenses from the Copyright Clearance
Center. These licenses implement fine-grained price discrimination that
increases profit to copyright owners while encouraging widespread
156
licensing and high levels of total surplus.
152.
See Merges, supra note 21, at 116 (arguing that digital technology reduces some but not all
kinds of transaction costs). Blanket licensing (and other schemes like site licenses that link price to the
number of end-users) imposes transaction costs because of the more complicated pricing scheme. They
are more complicated to negotiate than uniform prices and require on-going monitoring and occasional
enforcement. See CAsarez, supra note 48, at 644 (explaining how Texaco held a Copyright Clearance
Center license but was sued because it did not accurately report its photocopying).
153.
See 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2000). Lawsuits against universities for indirect copyright infringement
have discouraged professors from making unauthorized course packs. See Kenneth D. Crews, The Law
of Fair Use and the Illusion of Fair-UseGuidelines, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 639-41 (2001).
154.
Spontaneous uses that generate positive externalities might deserve fair use treatment as a
form of subsidy, but this should be justified by directly identifying the social benefit from the copying.
A copyright owner's hostile reaction to parody or criticism and bargaining failure attributable to
bilateral monopoly may justify fair use even in digital markets. See Merges, supra note 21, at 133.
Positive externalities are also commonly cited to justify fair use. See id. at 134. See also Loren, supra
note 21, at 5-6.
155.
Monitoring may continue despite a blanket license because the Copyright Clearance Center
licenses fall far short of the nearly universal coverage available from music performance licenses.
156.
The Copyright Clearance Center administers blanket photocopying licenses that link royalties
to the number of employees at a company. See Annual Copyright License, Copyright Clearance Center
Services, Inc., at http://www.copyright.com/Services/als.asp (last visited July 15, 2004). Site licensing
increases value to users by consolidating many transactions into a single transaction.
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Systematic photocopying also poses more of a profit threat than
spontaneous photocopying.' 57 Systematic users probably hold higher
valuations for the copied texts and are more likely to make a purchase than
spontaneous users. Furthermore, systematic use hurts profit through the
coalition diversity effect. 158 The effect on profit would be huge if firms
purchased single copies of business publications and made photocopies for
all of their employees. 159 Such copying would create significant demand
dispersion because of variation in firm size. 160 Photocopy licenses solve the
coalition diversity problem by charging fees based on number of
16 1
employees or number of copies.
Blanket licenses are not as useful for spontaneous photocopying.
There is not much benefit to publishers from price discrimination and
spontaneous classroom use probably has little effect on dispersion of
library demand because the pattern of use is unpredictable at the time the
157.
The divergent profit effect of spontaneous and systematic photocopying helps explain the
apparent conflict between American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994), and
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affid by an equally divided
Court 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam). Texaco systematically circulated the tables of contents of
journals and made archival copies for researchers that amounted to course packs. Texaco, 60 F.3d at
915-16. In contrast, the National Library of Medicine ("NLM") made photocopies for the public only in
response to requests for older or harder to find journals. Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1355. But the
NLM did make photocopies of widely available recent journals for recipients in the government. Id. at
1354-55.
158.
The distinction between single and multiple copies in the Classroom Guidelines plays the
same role as the distinction between systematic and spontaneous copying. See Agreement on Guidelines
for Classroom Copying in Not-for-Profit Educational Institutions with Respect to Books and
Periodicals, H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 68 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5681-82.
Multiple copies create coalition diversity and increase demand dispersion. See supra Part IV.B.
159.
For a case in which industry newsletters were photocopied, see Kenneth D. Crews, Copyright
at a Turning Point: CorporateResponses to the Changing Environment, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 277, 290
n.44 (1996). A law firm settled a copyright lawsuit arising because for eighteen years it had
photocopied a newsletter and distributed copies to attorneys in the firm; the firm purchased one copy
for an annual fee of $657 but declined to purchase additional copies at the price of $295. Id. See also
Television Digest, Inc. v. United States Tel. Ass'n, 841 F. Supp. 5, 7 (D.D.C. 1993) (relating that a
trade association bought a single subscription of a newsletter and routinely made twelve to twenty-six
copies for its employees).
160. Small companies might have a single employee reading a publication, while large companies
could stop purchasing multiple subscriptions and let a large number of employees share a single copy of
the text. Texaco subscribed to three copies of the Journal of Catalysis and supplied photocopied articles
from the journal to hundreds of scientists. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 22
(S.D.N.Y. 1992), amended by 60 F.3d at 913.
161.
Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., supra note 156. But see Cdsarez, supra note 48, at 703
(1996) ("[T]he number of potential copiers sharing a particular subscription (or broadcast) should make
no difference in the characterization of their copying as time-shifting or not.").

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:903

copied text is purchased. 162 Similarly, the requirement that a library must
be open to the public to qualify for the § 108 safe harbor means that the
pattern of photocopying is less predictable and unlikely to greatly influence
the dispersion of library demand. 163 A license might authorize spontaneous
photocopying for a fixed annual fee. The effect would be similar to a levy
on photocopiers that is distributed to copyright owners. 164 The license
would relieve the library of much of the burden of monitoring photocopier
usage, 165 but it would probably cut spontaneous use significantly without
adding much to profit. Spontaneous use would fall because librarians
probably do not appropriate much of the value from such use.1 6 6 Librarians
162.
Sharing made possible by photocopying would increase the number of users per copy of text,
and so the aggregation effect should dominate the coalition effect in this setting. It is possible that after
publishers respond to a decline in subscriptions with a price increase, photocopying in public sector
libraries could increase profit. Liebowitz, supra note 15, at 956; Liebowitz, supra note 87, at 192-98
(arguing that price discrimination by journals against libraries makes copyright relief unnecessary and
the faster increase in institutional journal prices compared to individual prices suggests price
discrimination is responsive to increased photocopying).
163.
Section 108 exempts from copyright liability certain photocopy-related activities at public
libraries. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2000). To qualify, the library must be open to the public (or at least open to
nonaffiliated researchers), the copies must be for scholarly, noncommercial use, and the activities
cannot be systematic or result in multiple copies. § 108(d).
Although libraries certainly differ in size, coalition diversity is not as much of an issue in this
market. The practice of making interlibrary loans evens out the number of library patrons that share a
work. See Zimmerman, supra note 121, para. 31 (explaining that libraries have "experimented with
consortia and interlibrary lending to attempt to deal with subscription prices"). Libraries have
considered a peer-to-peer file-sharing system similar to Napster that could replace interlibrary loans.
File-sharing could avoid the high labor costs required to scan documents for interlibrary loans. See
Napster C.E.O. Talks About Copyrights, June 17, 2001, at 2001 WL 22916440.
Some individual subscribers are likely to drop their subscriptions because library copies are more
attractive when photocopying is possible. This effect is mitigated by the ability of publishers to
discriminate between individual subscribers (who pay a lower rate) and institutional users such as
libraries. Offsetting a drop in individual subscriptions is an increase in the total number of readers. New
readers appear because some potential readers who do not individually subscribe also do not have the
patience to read a text in the library or wait to carry it home and read it. Since many libraries do not
allow journals, or at least recent journals, to circulate, the availability of photocopying could have a
significant effect on the number of journal article readers.
The case for digital interlibrary lending may not be as strong because publishers can distribute
digital text more efficiently than libraries. Most Elsevier Science journal subscriptions include Internet
access at no extra charge to users within the IP domain of the subscriber. See 2004 Subscription Price
List, at http://www.elsevier.comhomepage/subpricelist (last updated Dec. 30, 2003). But see Bartow,
supra note 50, at 824-26 (arguing that library patrons should retain the same rights in a digital world
that they previously possessed, and that the digital equivalent of sharing a book requires copying).
164.
See infra Part VII.B for a discussion of levies.
165.
Given my assumption that § 108 is repealed, the library would still have to monitor for
systematic photocopying.
166.
Suppose that X faces high transaction costs. Total surplus grows if X shares with Y, and the
copyright owner does not suffer any lost profit. If Y does not account for X's valuation, then site
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are more apt to recognize systematic copying and respond to lobbying from
systematic users than they are apt to respond to spontaneous use, especially
if the users are from outside the library's institution. Consider for example
the librarians at a private university. Universities that allow the general
public to use their collection and their photocopiers might not be willing to
pay much to license photocopying by these strangers. In summary,
spontaneous uses should be considered fair uses because the alternative
leads to output restriction and high transaction and enforcement costs.
B. RESEARCH USE
Courts favor research uses when applying the first fair use factor, the
purpose and character of the use. Fair use subsidizes research activities that
generate positive externalities, but there must be limits on this rationale.
Some copyrighted works are marketed exclusively for research use; if fair
use applies too broadly then there is no incentive to create and distribute
such works. These issues are nicely framed by a pair of photocopying cases
that feature research use, Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States,16 7 and

American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc. 168 In Williams & Wilkins, the
Court of Claims applied fair use in a case involving photocopies made by
the National Library of Medicine ("NLM") and the library at the National
Institute of Health ("NIH"). The NIH library made single photocopies of
articles in medical or scientific journals upon request by NIH research
scientists. The NLM made similar photocopies in response to interlibrary
loan requests. About ten years later in Texaco the Second Circuit refused to
apply fair use to a corporate library that made photocopies of articles from
1 69
scientific journals for Texaco research scientists.
The Court of Claims in Williams & Wilkins based its fair use decision
on the laudable purpose of the copying and the lack of market effect on the
plaintiff. 7 0 Specifically, the plaintiff did not show loss of subscriptions or
other persuasive evidence of harm from photocopying. 7 ' The court also
licensing will not be profitable, and the copyright owner will not authorize sharing. Thus, the socially
optimal policy allows sharing without permission.
167. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd by an equally
divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam).
168. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
169. See id.
at 915.
170. Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1354.
171. Id. at 1358. Nimmer criticizes the Court of Claims for mixing the issues of liability and
damages. 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 99, § 13.05[E][4][c]. That criticism is unwarranted. Fair
use analysis must balance the magnitude of the profit loss to the plaintiff against the total surplus
created by the defendant's use. Nimmer is more persuasive in his criticism of the assumptions standing
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noted that library "photo-duplication" was a common and accepted
practice. 172 The most important consideration for the court was its fear that
73
medical research could be harmed by a finding of infringement. 1
The Texaco court downplayed the significance of the research purpose
of Texaco's photocopying and instead emphasized that the market for
photocopy licenses would be harmed by a finding of fair use. 17 4 The court
criticized Williams & Wilkins, 175 but also distinguished it on two grounds.
First, photocopy licensing was a more realistic option for Texaco after the
establishment of the Copyright Clearance Center in 1978.176 Second, the
research at Texaco was more closely connected to the profit-making
activities of Texaco and, therefore, more commercial than the medical
177
research at issue in Williams & Wilkins.
Like the Texaco court, commentators who have compared the two
cases focus on the first and fourth fair use factors: the purpose and
character of the use and its market effects. Many commentators emphasize
the research purpose of the photocopying and favor recognition of fair use
in both cases; 178 others emphasize the negative market effect of
photocopying and oppose fair use in both cases. 179 Research use favors a
finding of fair use because research generates social benefit that is not
captured by the research organization.' 80 The gap between private and
social return causes an undersupply of research that can be remedied by a
subsidy. 181 Free photocopying might be justified as a research subsidy.
Critics respond that taxes, research grants, and the patent system are
behind the Court of Claims's analysis of harm to profit, id.; nevertheless, the Court of Claims may have
reached the correct conclusion as my discussion in the next few paragraphs will explain.
172. Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1356. See also Texaco, 60 F.3d at 934 (Jacobs, J.,
dissenting) ("[S]ingle photocopies for research and scholarly purposes has been considered both
reasonable and customary.").
173. See Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1354, 1356.
174. Texaco, 60 F.3d at 929-31.
175. See id. at 924 n.10 (criticizing the broad reliance on the metaphor equating photocopying
with note-taking).
176. See id. at 931. The Copyirght Clearance Center was formed in 1978. Corporate Overview,
Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., at http://www.copyright.comlAbout/default.asp (last visited July 17,
2004).
177. See Texaco, 60 F.3d at 921-22.
178. See Loren, supra note 21, at 50-53; Karen L. Still, American Geophysical Union v. Texaco,
Inc.: Expanding the Copyright Monopoly, 29 GA. L. REV. 1233, 1253-54 (1995).
179. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 99, § 13.05[E][4][d]-[e].
180. For evidence that the social return on private research and development is much higher than
the private return, see Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanismfor Encouraging Innovation, 113
Q.J. ECON. 1137, 1141 (1998).
181. See Loren, supra note 21, at 52; Merges, supra note 21, at 134-35.
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182
preferable to the fair use doctrine as a tool for promoting research.
Regardless of how much weight should be accorded a research purpose, the
Texaco court's treatment of Texaco's research purpose is flawed by its
failure to acknowledge that the subsidy rationale for fair use applies with as
183
much force to corporate research as it does to public sector research.

The analysis in Williams & Wilkins is flawed by the court's failure to
acknowledge the possibility of a photocopy license.' 84 The court apparently
assumed the only option for libraries given an adverse decision would be to
purchase more subscriptions.185 Although the decision pre-dated the CCC,
the blanket music performance licenses available from ASCAP and
Broadcast Media, Inc. were evidence of the possibility of efficient
photocopy licensing for institutions like libraries.' 86 Dissenting Chief Judge
Cowen believed that denying fair use would spur the parties to implement a
photocopy licensing scheme. 87 He might have been right, but of course, it
is not clear such a market would be desirable. Licensing generates more
favorable social welfare effects when applied to the systematic, commercial
182. Cf Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1057 (1989) (presenting though not necessarily endorsing
arguments against experimental use as a defense to patent infringement).
183. The educational role of public sector libraries provides an alternative subsidy rationale that
favors fair use for academic and public libraries, but not corporate libraries.
184. Betamax, supra note 8, at 1649-50 (criticizing Williams & Wilkins because of the court's
disbelief that a blanket photocopy license would keep transaction costs small relative to the benefits
from photocopying).
185. See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1356-57 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd
by an equally divided Court 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam).
186. See id. at 1379 (Cowen, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 1372 (Cowen, J., dissenting). Further evidence was available from European
experience with photocopy licenses and library lending rights. See Ginsburg, supra note 125, at 196
(describing photocopy licenses in the Nordic countries). Cf Lunney, supra note 14, at 976 n.4
(suggesting that the reversal of Sony might motivate Congress to adopt a levy system for home
recording). See generally Jennifer M. Schneck, Note, Closing the Book on the Public Lending Right, 63
N.Y.U. L. REV. 878 (1988) (describing lending rights).
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to the spontaneous,
photocopying of Texaco 188 than it does when applied
189
Wilkins.
&
Williams
of
photocopying
noncommercial
Besides photocopying, shared research use of software and databases
deserves special consideration under the fair use doctrine. The following
example illustrates a new argument in favor of fair use. The argument
shows sharing sometimes allows users to exert countervailing market
power against a seller to encourage output expansion.
The example features three academic researchers-X, Y, and Z-who
want to use a new software product. The value of the software varies
significantly across users. Suppose each of the three potential users is
equally likely to have a valuation of 3 or 7. Buyers know their valuation,
but the sellers do not know who has a value of 3 and who has a value of 7.
When the three users act independently, then the uniform monopoly price
is 7. Obviously, users purchase only if they have a valuation of 7. Since
each user will purchase with a probability of one-half, the expected profit is
10.5 and the expected total surplus is 10.5.190
Suppose X and Y form a coalition to share the product. If the sellers
maintain a uniform price of 7, then profit falls to 8.75 because of lost
sales. 19 1 The sellers optimally should adjust the price downward from 7 to
6 in response to sharing. X and Y always purchase because their joint
valuation is greater than or equal to 6. Z will purchase with probability onehalf; therefore the expected profit is 9, and the expected total surplus is
188. Texaco librarians as corporate employees are apt to do a good job finding the efficient mix of
journal subscriptions and photocopying, and incorporating the value users derive from photocopying
into their valuations when they purchase journals for the Texaco library. The reading and photocopying
habits of the researchers at Texaco are probably fairly predictable, and librarians can institute
systematic procedures to maximize the value derived from photocopying. Systematic use is easier to
monitor and can feasibly serve as the basis for a usage-sensitive photocopy royalty. Cf Am.
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 916, 931 (2d Cir. 1994) (explaining that the same
photocopying by an independent scientist might not infringe under fair use or de minimus doctrines).
The Texaco librarians circulated the journals and researchers indicated which articles they wanted
photocopied. The court made note of this "institutional, systematic photocopying." Id. at 915-16.
189. The Texaco library was closed to the public while the NLM was indirectly open to the public
through its active interlibrary loan program. Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1355. The NIH library was
open to the public but most users came from the NIH. Id. at 1347. Most of the requests to the NLM for
interlibrary loans came from other libraries or government agencies. Id. at 1349. The NLM identified
104 "widely-available" journals and generally required an individual to seek a copy from a nearby
library. Id.
190. The alternative price of 3 gives a profit of only 9.
191. A price of 7 would be accepted with probability one-half by Z. It would be rejected by X and
Y with probability one-fourth (when both had low values). This yields an expected profit of (1/2)(7) +
(3/4)(7) = 8.75.
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13.5.192 Thus the coalition diversity effect pushes down profit, but sharing
increases total surplus. Total surplus grows because X and Y always
purchase the product when they form a coalition, and Z's probability of
purchase remains unchanged.1 93 Total surplus and profit move in the
opposite direction because the sellers are hurt by lost sales, but from a
social point of view it does not matter whether X and Yeach purchase a unit
or share a single unit.
If a site license is feasible, then the sellers benefit from sharing in this
example. They offer a license of 7 for single users and a site license of 10
for a pair of users. 194 X and Y will accept the two-user site license as long
as at least one of the pair has a valuation of 7. If they both have valuations
of 3, then they stay out of the market. Z will accept the individual license if
he has a valuation of 7, otherwise he stays out of the market. Profit and
total surplus are both higher with sharing and the site license than with no
sharing. The expected profit to the sellers grows to 11 and the expected
total surplus grows to 12.
This example reaffirms the message that site licensing is an effective
marketing tool for extracting surplus from consumers. Surprisingly, all
three buyers are made worse off by site licensing compared to sharing and
uniform pricing. The uniform price was only 6. The site license raises Z's
price to 7 and the two-person coalition's price to 10. Notice that site
licensing yields more profit but less total surplus than uniform pricing;
expected profit grows from 9 to 11, while total surplus falls from 13.5 to
12. In this example, site licensing is a socially costly form of price
discrimination that reduces output and total surplus. This point deserves
192.
A price of 3 would always be accepted and yield a profit of 6. Higher prices are not
profitable because of the high probability of rejection that they generate.
193.
Given a coalition of all three users the monopoly price is 13, the expected profit is 11.375,
and the total surplus is 13.875. The price of 9 is certain to be accepted by the coalition and give a profit
of 9. The price of 13 is only rejected if all three users have values of 3, which occurs with probability
one-eighth. So the expected profit is (7/8)13. For higher prices of 17 and 21, the probability of rejection
is too high to make those choices profitable. The profit rises compared to the case with no sharing
because the aggregation effect is present and there is no coalition diversity effect.
194.
Notice that site licensing yields a typical pattern of volume discount from profit-maximizing
discrimination. The price per user falls from 7 to 5. I can extend the analysis to a coalition of three
buyers. The sellers would set a price of 13 for three users, which implies a per user price of 4.33.
The personal arbitrage constraint is always satisfied. The coalition of two would not purchase an
individual license at a savings of 3 because one of the users in the coalition would not be able to use the
software, implying a loss of at least 3. This assumes, of course, that license restrictions on the number
of users are enforceable. The coalition of three would not purchase a site license for two because the
savings are less than or equal to the loss in use value. They also would not purchase an individual

license or pair of individual licenses for the same reason.
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emphasis because many commentators assume that price discrimination
always raises total surplus.
This example also presents a clear divergence between the sellers'
interest in profit and the social interest in total surplus. Sharing by X and Y
reduces profit because of the coalition diversity effect, but it also increases
total surplus regardless of whether the sellers choose uniform pricing or site
licensing. Intuitively, total surplus increases because the two-user coalition
exerts socially beneficial countervailing power against the monopoly seller.
The monopoly output restriction caused by a uniform monopoly price is
eased when two potential users jointly purchase and share a single unit.
Sellers choosing a uniform price would not authorize sharing if it were
subject to their control. So the seller's control over sharing is a way to
discourage the development of countervailing power.195 If the sellers are
able to site license, then they will authorize sharing, but do not have to fear
the development of countervailing power. Sharing occurs on their terms.
The site license alleviates some of the inefficiency that occurs when the
sellers block sharing and charge a uniform price, but the site license is less
efficient than the uniform price that would prevail if fair use gives users the
right to share.
C. COMMERCIAL, NONCOMMERCIAL, AND PERSONAL USES

The distinction between commercial and noncommercial (or personal)
use plays more than one role in fair use jurisprudence. 196 In the context of
sharing cases, the distinction helps analyze cases with a mix of commercial
and noncommercial users in which the noncommercial users tend to have
lower valuations than the commercial users. Fair use protects
noncommercial coalitions that might be excluded from a market in which
the seller caters to commercial buyers. Alternatively, fair use might
facilitate desirable arbitrage against price discrimination that harms
noncommercial users.
195. Countervailing power is a threat to the sellers because it is harder for them to extract surplus
from a strong buyer, not because countervailing power moves the parties closer to the efficient output
level.
196. In fair use cases that track free speech law, it is important to distinguish the speech rights of
commercial, noncommercial, and individual speakers. See Tina J. Ham, Note, The Right of Publicity:
Finding a Balance in the Fair Use Doctrine-Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 36 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 543, 570-73 (2003). Also, personal use gets special consideration when copyright liability
threatens privacy. See Netanel, supra note 30, at 299.
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Generally, the case for sharing is weak when coalitions do a poor job
of fully accounting for the valuations of their members. 197 But there are
circumstances in which limited appropriability strengthens the case for the
right to share. Suppose that potential users U and X both have valuations of
3 for some copyrighted work; potential users V, W, Y, and Z all have
valuations of 5. As before, the marginal cost is zero. Without sharing, the
profit-maximizing price is 5, and profit and total surplus equal 20. Suppose
that U and V can share within their firm, and X and Y can share in a
noncommercial coalition. Suppose V fully appropriates the value imparted
to U, but Y does not appropriate any of the value imparted to X. Absent fair
use, the seller would continue to charge a price of 5 for the work, and a
license fee of 3 for sharing with one other user. The coalition of U and V
would pay a total of 8 for the work and the license, but Y would purchase
the work and not take a license, resulting in a profit and total surplus of 23.
If instead noncommercial sharing is fair use, then X and Ywould not need a
license. The seller would offer the same sale price and license terms, Y
would share with X, profit would remain at 23, and total surplus would rise
to 26. The policy implication of this example is that fair use may be a
desirable way to encourage noncommercial sharing that is excluded from
the market because the seller targets commercial sharing and sets a high
price that exceeds the valuation of noncommercial coalitions.' 98 In this
example, the noncommercial coalition holds a low valuation because of an
appropriability problem. A similar example can be constructed in which
noncommercial users simply have lower valuations.
197. The following example illustrates the relationship between appropriability, market demand,
and the market effect of copying. Suppose two users each have a valuation of 5 and two users each have
a valuation of 4. If there is no sharing, then the price is 4, and profit is 16. Next suppose that two
coalitions form, each with a high and a low-valuation user. Suppose the user with the value of 5 makes
the purchase decision. If the purchaser fully appropriates the valuation of the low value user, then the
new price is 9, and profit reaches its maximum possible value at 18. If the purchaser incorporates only
half of the value of the low-valuation user, then each coalition acts as if it has a valuation of 7 = 5 +
(4/2). In that case, the price is 7, and profit is 14. Notice that the aggregation effect from sharing tends
to raise profit, but incomplete appropriability reduces profit. These two effects counterbalance each
other if the purchaser incorporates three-fourths of the value of the low-valuation user. In that case, the
price is 8, and profit returns to 16.
198. Copyright owners would be worried that commercial users could masquerade as
noncommercial users and qualify for fair use. For example, corporate journal users can avoid paying
page-based photocopy royalties by copying at a public library. Corporate photocopying at a public
library is unlikely to be a fair use, but it is difficult to detect. The library is not liable for such infringing
photocopying as long as it complies with 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2000). Despite the possibility of avoiding
photocopy royalties, this problem is not serious. Corporate employees can avoid hassle and guilt by
complying with a photocopy license, and more importantly, royalties are often lump-sum fees rather
than page-based, so there is no incentive to go to the public library.
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In the previous example, noncommercial users were at a disadvantage
because, for some reason, the seller could not price discriminate in their
favor. In this example, fair use is warranted as a way to subvert
discrimination between commercial and noncommercial users. Consider a
market for copyrighted software and suppose there are three commercial
users X, Y, and Z and three noncommercial users x, y, and z, where each
lowercase letter represents the spouse of the user represented by uppercase
letter. Each family constitutes a coalition of two. Suppose that X, Y, and Z
each have a valuation of 5 for the software that they use at work. Their
family members have valuations of 1.5, 1, and 0.5 from home use, yielding
total valuations of 6.5, 6, and 5.5 for the three coalitions. If no sharing is
allowed, the uniform monopoly price is 5, profit is 15, and total surplus is
15. If sharing is allowed, the uniform monopoly price is 5.5, profit is 16.5,
and total surplus is 18. If sharing is blocked and the seller can discriminate
between home and business use, then the business price is 5 and the home
price is 1. Total profit rises to 17 and total surplus falls to 17.5. The price
discriminating seller blocks sharing because it interferes with the seller's
desire to segment the market based on business versus home use. 19 9 The
effect of the discrimination is to increase profit and decrease total surplus.
Sharing allows the users to gain countervailing power, which increases
consumer surplus and total surplus.
D. DIGITAL FILE-SHARING
Digital file-sharing is apt to present a fascinating new set of fair use
cases. At present, courts have decided only three peer-to-peer music filesharing cases, 20 0 but soon we are likely to see a range of cases involving
various digital content and technologies. 20 1 The music cases generally had
199. New EU rules adopted in February 2001 tighten the definition of private copy but allow
people to make private copies of data on the Internet and to share those copies with friends, provided
the copyright holder gets fair compensation. See Council Directive 2001/29/EC, art. 5(2)(b), 2001 O.J.
(L 176) 10, 16.
200. In In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 652-53 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
124 S. Ct. 1069 (2004), and in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1022, 1024 (9th Cir.
2001), courts found that the centralized Napster and Aimster music file-sharing services likely violated
music copyrights indirectly. By contrast, the court in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp.
2d 1029, 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2003), found the decentralized Grokster and Streamcast music file-sharing
services were not indirectly liable.
201.
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weak claims of fair use, but a valid fair use defense is certainly possible in
the context of digital file-sharing. The defendant in A&M Records, Inc. v.
Napster, Inc. argued that two music file-sharing purposes should be
considered fair use: listening to music before purchase and space-shiftingthat is, copying that allows music CD owners to listen to their music at
more than one location. 20 2 Given the global reach and anonymity of peerto-peer music file-sharing, it is not surprising that the Ninth Circuit rejected
these arguments. 20 3 Perhaps bowing to the inevitable, the defendants in
later cases involving Aimster and Grokster did not seriously contest the
issue of direct infringement.2 °4
There are two reasons that anonymous peer-to-peer music file-sharing
should not be a fair use. First, anonymity causes serious appropriability
problems-people who purchase CDs probably internalize a small fraction
of the value they create by offering music for download.20 5 Second, the
technology creates massive coalition diversity. 20 6 Thus there is little hope
that the music industry could offset lost sales by charging higher prices for
music. 20 7 The Napster court analysis of the first fair use factor did not
articulate these reasons clearly and offered some unhelpful or troubling
analysis instead.
bin/article.cgi?f=/news/archive/2003/03/27/financial2101EST0174.DTL (Mar. 27, 2003) (reporting
that about one-half of illegal downloads are music, about 5% are movies, and the remainder are images,
videogames, and software).
202. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1018-19.
203. The court held that sampling music before purchasing is not a fair use because copyright
owners should be able to control marketing. See id. at 1018-19. See also LIEBOWlTZ, supra note 29, at
14 (expressing skepticism that Napster provided favorable exposure that would generate increased
revenue from CD sales). The notion of space-shifting developed in Recording Industry Ass'n of
America v. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 1999), as an extension of
the time-shifting notion recognized by the Supreme Court in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 423 (1984). The Ninth Circuit distinguished those cases, observing that
"[b]oth Diamond and Sony are inapposite because the methods of shifting in those cases did not also
simultaneously involve distribution of the copyrighted material to the general public; the time or spaceshifting of copyrighted material exposed the material only to the original user." Napster, 239 F.3d at
1019. The court concluded market harm arose because of reduced CD sales and because entry into
Internet music distribution would be less profitable for plaintiffs. See id. at 1016.
204. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 648 (N.D. Ill. 2002), aff'd, 334 F.3d
643 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct 1069 (2004); Grokster,259 F. Supp. 2d at 1034-35.
205. See supra Part IHI.D.
206. See supra Part III.B.
207. See Stan J. Liebowitz, Will MP3 DownloadsAnnihilate the Record Industry? The Evidence
So Far 2-3, at http://www.utdallas.edu/-liebowit/knowledge-goods/records.pdf (June 2003) (arguing
that the evidence offered by experts in the Napster case failed to show any harm to music industry
profit, but more recent evidence does show harm).
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The Ninth Circuit dwelled on the questions of whether Napster filesharing involved a transformative use and whether it involved a
commercial use. The court properly concluded that copies made using
Napster were not transformative, but that conclusion is not helpful; 20 8 by
definition, sharing cases feature faithful copying. 20 9 The analysis of the
commercial nature of the use is mistaken and troubling. 210 The court
concluded that the file-sharing was commercial because it was anonymous
and it displaced music sales. 2 1' The displacement of music sales was
properly recognized in the court's analysis of the fourth fair use factor; it
should not have had independent significance in the analysis of the first
factor. The anonymous and large-scale nature of the use should be
considered directly under the first factor; there is no need to distort the
definition of commercial to cover plainly personal copies. Part V.C showed
that it is more sensible to reserve the commercial/noncommercial test for
distinguishing heterogeneous users of a copyrighted work, such as business
versus academic readers of a journal article.
A deeper understanding of the market effects of Napster-style copying
reveals the fair use defense is still plausible in a digital world-when
institutional context and technology permit only limited sharing, and
discourage intolerable coalition diversity and appropriability problems.
More simply, fair use is plausible when the sharing technology behaves
more like a photocopier or a VCR. Such technologies exist. 212 For example,
208. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1015.
209. The Supreme Court rejected the view that fair use requires some kind of productive or
transformative use in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 455 n.40
(1984), but transformative uses are treated more generously under fair use analysis. See Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
210. See Lunney, supra note 14, at 983, 990 (noting that the Supreme Court in Sony rejected the
view that private copying is commercial because it displaces videotape sales).
211.
See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1015.
212. Various technologies have been developed or proposed that limit how often digital content
can be copied. Digital audio tape machines are designed to control serial music copying.
Apple has developed the popular iTunes digital music store relying exclusively on software to
restrict the sharing of digital songs over the Internet. Apple's system, which has drawn the
support of the recording industry, permits consumers to share songs freely among up to three
Macintoshes and an iPod portable music player.
John Markoff, A Safer System for Home PCs Feels Like Jail to Some Critics, N.Y. TIMES, June 30,
2003, at C1. AOL Time Warner is developing a technology that uses a cable system to provide services
comparable to a digital video recorder. In contrast to TiVO, it "lets networks set the parameters,
dictating which shows users can reschedule, and it also creates ways for networks to insert
commercials." David D. Kirkpatrick, AOL is Planning a Fast-ForwardAnswer to TiVo, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 2003, at El. It also "prevents consumers from making, storing or sharing copies." Id.

20041

TOO MANY MARKETS OR TOO FEW?

people can use e-mail to share music files. 2 13 Sporadic e-mail distribution
of music files to friends and family seems likely, but large-scale
distribution to strangers does not. In terms of fair use, it is hard to
distinguish a gift of music via a cassette tape from a gift via e-mail. The
only plausible distinction must be based on the ease of e-mail compared to
audio-taping or the higher fidelity of digital files. It is not plausible to
distinguish the gifts on the grounds that digital file-sharing is commercial
and cassette-taping is not.
In Sony, the Supreme Court held that private copying of television
programs may be a fair use. 2 14 Specifically, it is fair use for consumers to
videotape televised movies so they can view them at some time after the
broadcast. 215 The Court did not consider whether it is also a fair use to
videotape a movie and then give the tape to a friend.2 16 Popular
commentary asserts that sharing analogue videotapes is a fair use, 2 17 but the
issue has not been decided in court. Courts will soon confront the digital
version of this question because Hollywood has targeted digital movie file2 18
sharing for litigation.
213. Instant messaging, with nearly one hundred million users, allows users to "send photos and
music files to each other, without being tracked by the record industry." Jefferson Graham, Net Services
Promise Anonymous File Sharing-Eventually, U.S.A. TODAY, June 26, 2003, at El.
214. Sony, 464 U.S. at 456 (1984).
215. The Court approved of time-shifting as a purpose deserving protection under the fair use
doctrine. Id. at 421. Many countries embrace the notion that "personal" use of copyrighted works is
outside of the scope of copyright protection. See DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 201, at 129 (noting that
the copyright law of many countries contains a "private use copying privilege"). There has been
relatively little written by U.S. courts but a great deal written by law professors in approval of timeshifting and other personal uses as fair use. See, e.g., Cisarez, supra note 48, at 720 (advocating either
court recognition of a personal use exemption or a personal use statute); Tussey, supra note 19, at
1181-89 (advocating a statutory personal use privilege).
216. Since Sony was accused of contributory infringement, the Court only needed to consider
whether there was significant noninfringing uses of the Betamax video-recorder. The Court found that
time-shifting was a significant use and that it was a noninfringing, fair use. There was no need to
establish whether other possible uses were infringing. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 442.
217. See, e.g., Marc Canter, What Constitutes Fair Use?, CNETNews.com, at
http://news.com.com/2102-1071_3281607.html (Nov. 20, 2001); Katherine Mangu-Ward, Big Music
Gets a Twofer in Congress with a Bill that Cuts Down on Fair Use and Bulks up Webcasting, at
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/00l/579azbul.asp (Aug. 29, 2002);
Ernest
Miller,
TiWo
to
Fair
Use:
Drop
Dead,
at
http://research.yale.edu/lawmeme/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid= 191 (Apr. 24, 2004).
218. Hollywood filed suit against SONICblue, the maker of a device called RePlayTV because the
device allows users to share movies via the Internet. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. RePIayTV, 298 F.
Supp. 2d 921, 923 (C.D. Cal. 2004). The suit also complained that the device allows consumers to
automatically delete commercials from recorded television broadcasts. See id. at 929. Time-shifting and
skipping commercials does not diminish advertising appeal or revenue. See Lunney, supra note 14, at
999-1007. The Electronic Frontier Foundation filed a related suit seeking a declaratory judgment that
recording and fast-forwarding television programs using RePlayTV are legal. See Lisa M. Bowman,
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Digital movie file-sharing issues straddle the concerns raised in Sony
and Napster. Digital video recorders facilitate a greater scale of sharing
than analogue recorders, 2 19 but they can be designed to limit the amount of
220
sharing and prevent the anonymous file-sharing condemned in Napster.
A device called RePlayTV was modified under threat of copyright suit so
22 1
that users could no longer share movies over the Internet.
The fair use analysis of movie-sharing parallels the analysis of timeshifting in Sony. Whether for time-shifting or sharing, the user copies the
entire movie, so the third factor, the portion of the copyrighted work used,
favors the copyright owners. Movies are highly expressive works, so the
second factor, the nature of the work copied, normally would also favor
copyright owners. 22 2 The Sony Court, however, dismissed that presumption
223
because the movies were available free of charge on broadcast television.
The same analysis applies to movie-sharing, but it must be updated in light
of the prevalence of commercial-free pay-per-view and premium cable
television movies. When users share the latter formats the second factor
224
moves back in favor of the copyright owner.
Analysis of the first factor, the purpose of, the copying, presents more
of a challenge. Sony seems to indicate that movie-sharing, like timeSuit Filed over ReplayTV Features, CNETNews.com, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-933398.html
(June 6, 2002). The movie industry distinguishes Sony by pointing to RePlayTV's movie-sharing
feature, and by arguing that ad-skipping will be a more serious problem with digital video recorders.
See Lunney, supra note 14, at 1001. Like Sony, SONICblue is charged with contributory copyright
infringement. RePlayTV, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 923. See Part VII.A for a discussion of contributory
infringement.
219. The RePlayTV device allows users to share a movie with as many as fifteen friends. See
Doug
Isenberg,
High-Tech
TV
Recording,
the
Internet
and the
Law,
at
http://www.gigalaw.com/articles/2001/isenberg-2001 -11 .html (Nov. 2001).
220. See id.; Lisa M. Bowman, Replay TV Puts Ad Skipping on Pause, CNETNews.com, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1041_3-1015121.html (June 10, 2003) (reporting that the new RePlay TV
devices will not contain the ad-skipping and send show features).
221. See id. The other leading digital video recorder does not enable sharing, but the market is just
developing. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 212 ("Satellite services, cable systems and television
manufacturers are all racing to promote their versions of the TiVo-like technologies .... ").
222. Copyright law assumes that more expressive works require stronger incentives and deserve
"thicker" copyright protection. Conversely, less expressive works need relatively weak incentives and
get only "thin" copyright protection. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990); Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
223. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Univeral City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984).
224. For the argument that the second factor should not be weighed too heavily in the case of
popular entertainment, see Lunney, supra note 14, at 1017-20 (explaining that extra profit in the movie
and television industry tends to flow to stars and does little to expand output).
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shifting, is a personal, noncommercial use, 225 but the Ninth Circuit treated
music file-sharing as a commercial use in Napster.226 RePlayTV differs
from the Napster software because it does not allow anonymous filesharing. It more closely resembles the practice of sharing a cassette of
recorded music or a videotaped movie with a friend. Thus SONICblue can
argue that it enables a reasonable and customary form of movie-sharing,
and such uses tend to be fair. 227 Copyright owners can respond that the
scale of sharing will be greater with the new technology and so no custom
has been established. The concern that file-sharing displaces music sales
(or movie sales and rental) ultimately gets resolved in the analysis of the
market effect factor. Good copyright policy should balance lost 2sales
28
against expanded access to music or movies made possible by sharing.
The market effect of movie-sharing is difficult to discern because
movie marketing is complex. The complexity arises because movies are
released in a variety of formats in a relatively fixed sequence. Movies are
first released in theaters, and then several weeks later to video and DVD for
rental and sale. 229 Movies first appear on television in pay-per-view format
about six weeks after the video release. 230 There are three later television
release dates for premium pay channels, network television, and
225.
Space-shifting is fair use. Personal use is fair use. See Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 593 (2003) (noting that fair use may protect space-shifting and other private
forms of private copying); Lunney, supra note 14, at 989-90 (discussing the Supreme Court's
characterization of videotaping as noncommercial in Sony).
See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001). See also
226.
DIGITAL DILEMMA, supra note 201, at 129.
227.
See Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1380-81 (Ct. Cl. 1973)
(Cowen, J., dissenting), affd by an equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (per curiam).
228.
Courts are reluctant to permit such balancing, though, because it invites pirates to raise a fair
use defense. Lunney argues expanded access counts as a pro-defendant purpose. Lunney, supra note 14,
at 977-78. Jessica Litman advocates reforming copyright law by replacing the exclusive right to
reproduce with an exclusive right of commercial exploitation. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL
COPYRIGHT 180-81 (2001). But see LESSIG, supra note 49, at 258 (arguing that the Internet erased
meaningful distinctions between commercial and noncommercial). The significance of the distinction is
declining because the Internet makes not-for-profit piracy feasible. Most software pirates that distribute
their pirated goods do not get any money for their troubles. See Jennifer 8. Lee, Pirates on the Web,
Spoils on the Street, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2002, at Gl. The same story applies to videogames that are
shared over the Internet using peer-to-peer file-sharing methods. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 948
F. Supp. 923, 927 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (discussing the sharing of videogames using a bulletin board); John
Borland, Hackers Break Dreameast Safeguards, Distribute Games Online, CNETNews.com, at
http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-2181596.html?tag=rltdnws (June 30, 2000); Stephen Shankland,
New Napster-Like Service Enables Game Swapping, CNETNews.com, at http://news.com.comlnews/O1006-200-2417632.html (Aug. 2, 2000).
See Monster that Ate Hollywood, supra note 108.
229.
230.
Id.
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syndication. 23 1 This marketing structure is designed to sort consumers
according to their eagerness to see a movie and willingness to pay.
Television viewers fall into the last four of the six release windows and so
have lower valuations. One effect of movie-sharing is to mix television
viewers, who otherwise would have been segregated into separate release
windows. There is also an indirect effect on the two earlier release
windows. A change in prices charged at later release dates ripples through
the entire pricing structure.
Intuition based on the model in Part III suggests that sharing of payper-view and premium cable movies probably hurts profit in the television
markets without raising total surplus. 2 3 2 If current marketing practices do
indeed sort customers into relatively homogeneous groups, then sharing
interferes with that sorting and increases demand dispersion. 233 If movie
studios respond to sharing by increasing prices for pay-per-view and
premium cable, that would hurt total surplus by encouraging television
234
viewers to delay their viewing until movies appear on free television.
Movie-sharing could also lead to a longer interval between the release of
videos and DVDs and the release of pay-per-view. The longer interval
would counteract consumers' temptation to wait for the television release
235
and share a copy, instead of paying the higher sale or rental price.
VI. ENFORCEMENT, SELF-HELP, AND § 1201
Parts VI and VII begin to explore optimal copyright policy toward
sharing in environments with strategic coalitions and costly enforcement.
231.

Id.

232.

RePIayTV fares better on the issue of sharing movies released on nonpremium cable and

broadcast television. See Lunney, supra note 14, at 1008-13. Cf Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S.
394, 411-12 (1974) (emphasizing that increasing the audience for commercial television through cable
retransmission was beneficial to copyright owners). But see Kirkpatrick, supra note 212 (reporting that
network executives worry that letting consumers watch shows at any time might reduce the demand for
syndication of television shows).
233. Letting a single viewer share with as many as fifteen friends creates a serious problem from
coalition diversity. That problem may be mitigated, though, if viewers actually choose to share with
only a small number of other viewers. Also, with current technology the time required to download
video files limits the amount of sharing. If RePIayTV allowed sharing with only one or two friends,
then the device would permit practices that look more like the sharing currently practiced with
videotape recorders.
234. Total surplus falls because delayed consumption is an economic cost in a world with
impatient consumers.
235. Lunney discusses a different feature of RePlayTV: its ability to automatically delete
commercials following time-shifting. He argues that the practice should not harm profit in the network
and syndication release windows as long as time-shifting represents a sufficiently small fraction of a
consumer's time. Lunney, supra note 14, at 1010-11, 1013.
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My conclusions are more tentative because the issues are more difficult and
less analyzed by economists. The coalitions in Part III have exogenously
fixed membership. In reality, some coalitions are formed for the purpose of
sharing; their size and membership are sensitive to enforcement and other
market factors. Costly enforcement complicates the model from Part III in
two ways. The copyright owner will choose an optimal mix of enforcement
and self-help measures, and certain coalitions will infringe and participate
in unlawful sharing. Part VI analyzes the ways copyright owners use
enforcement and self-help measures to directly influence coalition
membership. Part VII analyzes the ways copyright policy indirectly
influences coalition membership and sharing.
All coalitions make strategic judgments about whether to infringe, but
only certain coalitions make strategic judgments about membership. The
size and identity of members of local coalitions based on kinship or
friendship are not very sensitive to conditions in the market for the
copyrighted work. Likewise, membership in an institutional coalition like a
business or a school is not influenced by copyright concerns. In contrast,
anonymous coalitions of music file-sharers or video rental store customers
form for the purpose of sharing a copyrighted work. The size of such
endogenous coalitions is sensitive to market factors, including the original
sale price of the work and the risk of enforcement (for coalitions engaged
in infringing activity).236 The size of the coalition is also sensitive to the
preferences of potential members. Whether a person borrows a book from a
library or buys the book depends on his patience. People sensitive to
quality degradations caused by sharing might prefer to purchase an original
product. Those who do share will limit the size of the coalition so that the
average waiting time before use does not get too long, or so that quality is
not degraded too much by sharing with too many people. 23 7 Decentralized
236.
Conner and Rumelt observe that individuals have different costs of copying software because
they differ in their ability to defeat copy protection, their expected penalty and reputational loss from
getting caught, their guilt from violating an ethical norm, and opportunity cost of lost warranties,
documentation, customer service, and so forth. Conner & Rumelt, supra note 80, at 127. See also Ram
D. Gopal & G. Lawrence Sanders, Preventive and Deterrent Controlsfor Software Piracy, 13 J. MGMT.

INFO. SYS. 29, 39 (1997) (arguing that the optimal size of a sharing coalition balances the desire to
spread the cost of a copy versus the fear that wider sharing increases the risk of detection). But see
Mary Madden & Amanda Lenhart, Memorandum on Music Downloading, File-Sharing and Copyright
1, at http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIPCopyrightMemo.pdf (July 2003) ("[Sixty-seven percent] of
Internet users who download music say they do not care about whether the music they have
downloaded is copyrighted.").

237. Privacy and security might both be compromised by using file-sharing programs. A user
might download a file containing a virus, or upload files containing sensitive private information. See
John Borland, Gnutella Swapping Cookies, Too, CNETNews.com, at http://news.com.com/2100-

1023_3-252338.html (Feb. 8, 2001) (explaining that someone sharing a file via Gnutella might
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coalitions like those engaged in peer-to-peer file-sharing face collective
238
action problems that exert additional pressure to limit size.
A sophisticated seller can apply these insights and take steps to
discourage coalition formation. The seller has two tools to influence
sharing by coalitions: litigation and self-help. 239 Investment in enforcement
activity determines the frequency of unlawful sharing. Higher enforcement
activity leads to less unauthorized sharing. 240 Copy control technology
inadvertently share cookies that could expose them to theft of identity). Users have to worry about
getting the right files, especially since the music industry has begun spoofing file-sharers.
238.
See LIEBowrrz, supra note 29, at 15 & n.54 (discussing how the music file-sharing
technology Limewire includes a feature that penalizes free-riders); Lunney, supra note 84, at 855
n.145.
For private sharing to occur, someone must undertake the expense of loading the work on her
computer and then open her computer to others, with consequential risks to security and her
bandwidth usage. With small group sharing, peer pressure within the group may be sufficient
to ensure that each person contributes to the works uploaded and available for copying. For
small groups, the security risks and costs associated with offering the work to others for
copying are minimal. Of course, in such small groups, that same peer pressure is also likely to
increase the group's paying demand for works as well.
Lunney, supra note 84, at 868 n. 186.
239.
The seller cannot choose and at best has indirect control over who shares. See Ingela Alger,
Consumer Strategies Limiting the Monopolist's Power: Multiple and Joint Purchases, 30 RAND J.
ECON. 736, 736 (1999). In addition to litigation and self-help the seller can sometimes use pricing to
control sharing. High prices tend to increase coalition size, and low prices or selective discounts reduce
coalition size or may even stop sharing completely. This tool is only effective if the price cut required to
break up coalitions does not sacrifice too much revenue. It is possible that a market with sharing can
have multiple equilibria. For example, there might be a low price equilibrium with little sharing, and a
high price equilibrium with extensive sharing. Oz Shy and Jacques-Franqois Thisse analyze multiple
equilibrium in the market for software with network externalities. See Shy & Thisse, supra note 85.
240.
Up until now, the music industry has not had much success with a vigorous campaign of
indirect enforcement, and they are shifting greater effort to direct enforcement. Initially, the industry
filed lawsuits against file-sharing facilitators such as MP3.com, Napster, and MP3Board.com. See Price
Discrimination,supra note 19, at 132 n.326. See also Jon Healey, Overseas-Based Web Sites Make for
Difficult Copyright Enforcement, at http://www.computeruser.com/news/02/08/09/news2.html (Aug. 9,
2002) (reporting that in 2001, 28,000 music sites were shut down throughout the world for trading
pirated files).
Apparently, direct enforcement efforts will target users responsible for uploading a significant
number of files. This strategy helps aggravate the collective action problem discussed supra note 238.
See, e.g., Tussey, supra note 19, at 1159 (noting that intellectual property lawsuits against end-users are
becoming common in markets for digital works); John Borland, R1AA Sues Campus File-Swappers,
CNETNews.com, at http://news.com.com/2100-1027-995429.html (Apr. 3, 2003) (reporting that the
Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA") sued four students at three different universities
because of their role in deploying music file-sharing software); Lisa M. Bowman, Labels Aim Big Guns
at Small File Swappers, CNETNews.com, at http://news.com.com2100-1027-3-1020876.html (June
25, 2003) (reporting that the RIAA plans to start thousands of lawsuits against individuals who offer a
substantial number of music files for download); Madden & Lenhart, supra note 236, at 3 (reporting
that 21% of Internet users allow others to download files from their computers); Music Industry Wins
Approval of 871 Subpoenas, at http://www.usatoday.comltech/news/techpolicy/2003-07-18-riaasuits.x.htm (July 18, 2003) (reporting that the RIAA has started a campaign of lawsuits against music
file swappers).
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substitutes for copyright enforcement as a method to discourage file242
24 1
sharing. A seller may use encryption or other anti-copying technology
to raise the cost of making and sharing unauthorized copies. The goal of
this technology is to prevent a user from making copies of a copyrighted
work, limit the number of copies that can be made, 243 control the number of
possible uses of a copy, or control some other attribute. 2 1 Various copyprevention techniques have been used by software publishers since at least
the early 1980s. 245 Copyright law aids seller self-help measures by making
See Weinberg, supra note 36, at 1273 (noting that trusted-system technology allows sellers to
241.
block small-scale copying and resale); Melanie Austria Farmer & Jim Hu, RealNetworks Pushes
Copyright Initiative, CNETNews.com, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-268717.html?legacy=cnet
(June 20, 2001) (reporting that RealNetworks has entered a joint venture with AOL Time Warner and
Bertelsmann to develop streaming technology that will support subscription services, video-on-demand,
and other business models).
242. See Digital Works, supra note 19, at 889-92; John Borland, Universal Copy-Protected CD
Shuns Players, CNETNews.com, at htttp://news.com.com/12100-1023-277197.html (Dec. 18, 2001)
(reporting the development of music CDs designed to prevent conversion to unauthorized MP3 files);
Dawn C. Chmielewski, Music Industry Swamps Swap Networks with Phony Files, at
http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/3560365.htm (June 27, 2002) (reporting that the music
industry is spoofing peer-to-peer music file-sharing services with files containing gaps and other
imperfections); Doug Lichtman & David Jacobson, Anonymity a Double-Edged Sword for Pirates OnLine, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 13, 2000, at 25 (suggesting that the music industry could flood the
Internet with decoy MP3 files to stop piracy and authentic files could be stored and distributed from
reputable sites); David Segal, A New Tactic in the Download War: Online "Spoofing" Turns the Tables
on Music Pirates, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2002, at AI (discussing the distribution of spoof music files).
at
243.
See John Borland, 100 Million Copyproof CDs Sold?, CNETNews.com,
http://news.com.com2100-1027-995200.html (Apr. 2, 2003) (reporting that over one hundred million
copy protected music CDs have been sold worldwide, mostly in Europe and Japan, and that the latest
version of the technology allows consumers to copy music onto their computer, but makes further
copying difficult); Steve Pain, E-Business-MS may have the Answer to Piracy, BIRMINGHAM POST,
Jan. 28, 2003, at 21 (explaining that Microsoft has developed software that prevents someone from
burning a copy of music recorded on a CD). The Audio Home Recording Act requires that digital tape
players include a copy limitation feature. The serial copyright management system allows unlimited
copies from the original but prevents copies from copies. See Digital Works, supra note 19, at 895
n.252.
244. See Amy Harmon, RealNetworks Goes After Bigger Piece of Media Library Pie, N.Y. TIMES,
June 20, 2001, at C2 (reporting that RealNetworks software "can allow consumers to buy a movie for
two days, or five viewings, or three viewings over the course of a month, all for different prices");
Laura M. Holson, Twilight of the CD? Not ifit Can Be Reinvented, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003, at C1
(reporting that Microsoft has developed technology to limit copying of songs from CDs); Michael
Liedtke, Users Dislike Intuit Change: Anti-Piracy Code Required, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 9,
2003, at 3C (reporting that tax preparation software has a copy control feature allowing the software to
be used on more than one computer, but documents can only be printed using the machine where the
software was first loaded); Morpheus Site Adds Anti-Piracy Feature, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2002, at C8
(reporting that a file-sharing service will add a feature that erases a downloaded song after the user
listens to it a certain number of times).
245.
See Digital Works, supra note 19, at 885; Hal R. Varian, Internet Changes the Economics of
Information Industries,at http://partners.nytimes.com/library/financial/columns/072700econ-scene.htm
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it illegal to circumvent anticopying technology for the purpose of
sharing.2 46 Most self-help measures do not eliminate sharing, but they
247
reduce its frequency by increasing the CoSt.
The benefit to the seller of well-targeted enforcement can be
illustrated by returning to the example in Part 111.13 in which X and Y have
valuations of 3, and Z has a valuation of 5. Suppose that coalitions are not
fixed exogenously; instead any pair can form a coalition. Further suppose
that sharing is unlawful, enforcement is costly, and price discrimination is
not feasible. Given these assumptions, a copyright owner would compare
the profit available from various patterns of sharing and tailor its
enforcement effort to induce the "right" pattern of sharing. 24 8 Specifically,
the copyright owner would discourage Z, the high valuation user, from
sharing with anyone, while tolerating or even encouraging sharing between
X and Y. Essentially, the copyright owner uses selective enforcement to
choose a pattern of sharing that smoothes demand rather than a pattern of
2 49
sharing that increases demand dispersion.
A fortunate seller could bypass the problem of costly enforcement if
self-help measures were suitably strong. Now that the initial optimism
about digital rights management has faded, most commentators expect
copyright owners to use some mix of self-help and enforcement. 250 Music
(July 17, 2000) (reporting that Lotus abandoned copy protection and reduced the price of its spreadsheet
software to meet its competition).
246. Section 1201 of the Copyright Act (part of the DMCA) facilitates this encryption strategy by
prohibiting unauthorized decryption. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(1)(A) (2000).
247. See David Pogue, The Internet as Jukebox, at a Price, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2003, at G1
(reporting that music companies sell digital music files over the Internet that consumers can download
to a CD, and the music files are designed so that sharing is inconvenient but feasible for moderately
sophisticated users).
248. No sharing leads to a price of 3 and profit of 9. Sharing by X and Yleads to a price of 5 and
profit of 10. Sharing by X and Z, or Y and Z, leads to a price and profit of 8. The RIAA says it will
target lawsuits only against computer users who distribute a substantial amount of music. See Peter
Kaplan,
Music
Industry
Says
Targets
Only
Major
Swappers,
at
http://in.tech.yahoo.com/030819/137/270xb.html (Aug. 19, 2003).
249. The merits of selective enforcement are noted in Bakos et al., supra note 19, at 141-42
(pointing out that sharing increases profit if coalitions are formed mainly by low-valuation users).
250. See Netanel, supra note 3, at 9 (noting that the music industry is combining digital rights
management and other self-help with traditional enforcement measures); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation on the File-Swapping Networks,
89 VA. L. REV. 505, 582-83 (2003) (arguing that the music industry needs to combine self-help with
enforcement measures). Optimism about digital rights management faded as it became evident that each
new method was vulnerable to hacking. Id. at 9-10. Copy control technology may have a different
impact than litigation on coalition membership. See generally Gopal & Sanders, supra note 236. Ram
Gopal and G. Lawrence Sanders conclude that preventive controls have a negative social welfare effect
compared to deterrence via litigation. The basis of this claim is that preventive controls do not change
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and movie sellers are likely to deploy copy-prevention technologies and
enforce § 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to discourage
sharing. 251' Most likely, copyright owners will sue to stop distribution of
circumvention tools and continue to direct enforcement measures against
252
high valuation users.
Since litigation and self-help influence the frequency of sharing, rather
than asking whether the law should allow sharing without permission from
the seller, the better normative question is how much sharing is optimal. 53
club membership, but do eventually cause clubs to drop out of the market. Deterrence can change club
membership and reshape the demand curve, which leads to a lower price and more profit (if the cost of
increased deterrence is not too large).
251. See Netanel, supra note 3, at 9-11. Section 1201 establishes liability for circumventing "a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title." 17 U.S.C. §
1201(a)(1)(A) (2000). The statute also attaches liability to people who indirectly promote
circumvention by distributing circumvention tools. Id. § 1201(a)(2)(A)-(C), (b)(I)(A)-(C). One benefit
of this legislation is that it cuts off the wasteful race between makers of copy control technology and
circumvention technology. See Adelstein & Peretz, supra note 149, at 213-16 (describing the race to
protect and circumvent protection of software). But the current statute probably goes too far.
Decryption technology useful for gaining access to information that is not protected by copyright law is
likely to be useful for defeating technological measures that control access to copyrighted works-and
so violate the DMCA. See Lunney, supra note 84, at 835-36.
252. Circumvention technology is likely to be used by a young and educated set of consumers.
They are likely to be high-valuation users of products like videogames, so sharing would increase
demand dispersion, but they are likely to be low-valuation users of products like business software, so
sharing could reduce demand dispersion. When self-help is cheaper than enforcement it can be used in a
socially desirable fashion to discourage socially costly sharing. See generally Yehning Chen & Ivan
Png, Software Pricing and Copyright: Enforcement Against End-Users (May 1999) (unpublished
manuscript, at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id=165228)
(arguing that price
discrimination may improve the alignment of the social and private incentives to enforce copyright
law). The incentives diverge under a uniform price; monopolists rely too much on enforcement. A price
cut turns marginal copyists into buyers. Increasing enforcement turns some marginal copyists into
buyers and forces other marginal copyists out of the market. Furthermore, increasing enforcement
increases the number of copyists who are caught and denied the benefits of the product. Price
discrimination can ease this problem if the low price can be directed at those most likely to pirate. The
seller would reject the other possible patterns of sharing. Strict enforcement might stop all sharing, but
this is counterproductive because it is more costly than selective enforcement, and because the
underlying pattern of demand is more dispersed-and in the example in which X and Yhave valuations
of 3, while Z has a valuation of 5, profit falls from 10 to 9. If all three users could unite in a single
coalition the seller would be pleased because profit would rise to 11 and enforcement costs would
disappear. But this ignores the countervailing power that an all-inclusive coalition would have against
the seller. It seems that the three-user coalition would be able to bargain for a better deal, thereby
causing profit to fall.
253. Yehning Chen and Ivan Png develop a model in which consumers vary in terms of their
valuation: consumers with high valuations purchase originals, those with intermediate valuations make
copies, and those with the lowest valuations do not purchase. They show that price and enforcement are
two policies that affect the extent of copying. A price cut induces some intermediate valuation
consumers to switch from copying to purchasing. Increasing enforcement induces some intermediate
valuation consumers to switch from copying to purchasing, and others to stop copying and exit the
market. From a social viewpoint a price cut has two advantages: it is easy to implement and it brings
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Legal policy affects the cost and deterrent power of enforcement, which in
turn affects the level of enforcement effort by the seller and ultimately the
frequency of sharing.25 4 Similarly, legal policy might encourage,
discourage, or be neutral toward self-help measures.
Copy control technology and enforcement often have similar policy
effects, but there are some important differences. First, most copy control
technologies apply indiscriminately to piracy and sharing; 255 copyright
rights can be tailored to deter piracy more strongly than sharing. Second,
copy-prevention schemes sometimes generate a costly spiral of
circumvention and anticircumvention measures. 256 Third, copy control
technology may cause social harm when an optimal copyright policy would
copyists into the market rather than blocking their use. The copyright owner will choose a mix of
monitoring and price reduction that relies too much on monitoring. See id.
254. See David Becker, New Bill Injects FBI into P2P Battle, CNETNews.com, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1028-3-101981 l.html (June 20, 2003) (reporting that proposed federal
legislation directs "the FBI to develop a program to deter online traffic of copyrighted material");
Lawmakers Sic Ashcroft on File Swappers, at http://vigilant.tv/article/1998 (Aug. 9, 2002) (noting that
congressional members have asked the Department of Justice to increase criminal enforcement against
music file-sharing); Declan McCullagh, DOJ to Swappers: Law's Not on Your Side, CNETNews.com,
at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-954591.html (Aug. 20, 2002) (reporting that a deputy assistant
attorney general warned that the government was considering criminal prosecution of individual filesharers);
Andy
Patrizio,
DOJ
Cracks
Down
on
MP3
Pirate,
at
http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,21391,00.html (Aug. 23, 1999) (reporting that network
administrators at the University of Oregon tipped off federal law enforcers who obtained a guilty plea
from a student for trading hundreds of music files and software); John Schwartz, Trying to Keep Young
Internet Users From a Life of Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2001, at Cl (reporting that federal raids
targeted college students who traded software for fun not profit); Senator: Trash Illegal Downloaders'
PCs, at http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/internet/06/18/download.music.ap/index.html (June 18, 2003)
(reporting that Senator Orrin Hatch, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, advocated the development
of software that would destroy the computers of users who illegally download music files).
255. See Holson, supra note 244 ("Fearing a consumer backlash, the industry has slowed down
those copy-protection efforts."). A recent lawsuit complains of unfair business practices by a CD
manufacturer that did not indicate on the label that this copyright control technology was used on the
CD. The complaint is available at http://www.techfirm.comlmccomp.pdf (last visited July 19, 2004).
See
also
Richard
Menta,
Woman
Sues
over
Copy-Protected
CDs,
at
http://www.mp3newswire.net/stories/2001/cdsue.html (Sept. 8, 2001) (describing a technology that
prevents a computer from playing a CD until the user registers on-line, prevents conversion to MP3
format, and prevents copying of the CD for use on a personal MP3 player).
256. See John Borland, New Kazaa Likely to Raise Labels' Ire, CNETNews.com, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023_3-958912.html (Sept. 22, 2002) (describing a new version of Kazaa
file-sharing software that combats spoof files by relying on filters and user ratings of file quality);
Researchers Claim They Have Hacked SDMI Watermarks, CONSUMER ELECS., Oct. 30, 2000, 2000 WL
8539458 (reporting that researchers cracked four digital watermarks proposed for use in the Secure
Digital Media Initiative, a recording industry forum); Segal, supra note 242 (reporting that music filesharing services are trying to develop a rating system that will defeat spoofing).
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allow sharing; self-help measures can negate that policy choice. 257 The
harm may be aggravated when copy-prevention technology is combined
with digital rights management technology. 258 Digital rights management
technology facilitates site licenses and consumer use restrictions that
generate the social costs discussed in Parts V.B and V.C. On the other
hand, the coupling of copy-prevention technology and digital rights
management might well facilitate fine-grained price discrimination that has
a positive impact on profit and total surplus.
Finally, good policy toward sharing should encourage properly
targeted enforcement. The previous discussion assumed the law did nothing
special to facilitate selective enforcement; sharing or copy-protection
circumvention was proscribed and the copyright owner chose a targeted
enforcement policy. Actually, fair use encourages selective enforcement
against sharing. 259 The balancing required by the fair use doctrine implies
that the strength of the defense varies with the context of the sharing. As a
result, a seller might have a stronger copyright infringement case against
one coalition than another coalition in the same market, and the seller can
be guided to target enforcement in accord with social goals reflected in the
260
fair use factors.
257. Netanel, supra note 3, at 40 ("The EU Copyright Directive and the DMCA both apparently
allow technology and contract to supplant statutory limitations on copyright holders' proprietary
control."). Enforcement might be socially preferable to encryption because increased enforcement leads
to smaller coalitions, while encryption can drive low-valuation users out of the market completely. See
Gopal & Sanders, supra note 236, at 29.
258. Legal policy can influence Internet infrastructure in ways that impede or facilitate price
discrimination. See Weinberg, supra note 36, at 1279 (arguing that a pseudonymous trusted-system
technology facilitates protection of intellectual property while limiting price discrimination to attributes
voluntarily provided by a user).
259. There are times when copyright law dictates selective enforcement. For example, the
limitations on the public performance right in copyright law excuse sharing in an educational setting
that would be infringing in any other setting. Section 110(5) is another significant exemption that
applies to "home-style receivers" used to perform music in bars and other small businesses. See 17
U.S.C. § 110(5) (2000). This section appears to be inefficient. Transaction costs are low, sharing creates
coalition diversity, and bars and other small businesses should appropriate a significant amount of the
value from their performances.
260. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994), and Williams &
Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd by an equally divided Court420 U.S.
376 (1975) (per curiam), suggest that fair use may contribute to social value by encouraging
appropriately targeted enforcement against library photocopying. See supra notes 167-89 and
accompanying text.
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VII. APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK TO COPYRIGHT POLICIES
THAT REGULATE SHARING INDIRECTLY
New technologies and institutions that facilitate sharing can disrupt
established channels for marketing copyrighted works. Copyright law can
regulate sharing indirectly by taxing reproductive equipment and media, or
by finding that equipment manufacturers and institutions involved in
sharing indirectly infringed a copyright holder's rights. These two
approaches have similar advantages and disadvantages. Comparison
between the two parallels the familiar comparison between property rules
and liability rules. 26 1 Indirect infringement performs best when transaction
costs are low and parties can bargain to establish institutions that facilitate
efficient forms of sharing. Taxation performs best when bargaining
problems impede development of an efficient private ordering, provided
the tax policy can be insulated from political rent-seekers and there is
adequate information for setting taxes.
A.

CONTRIBUTORY AND VICARIOUS INFRINGEMENT

Copyright law grants copyright owners the right to sue third parties
who facilitate sharing. There are two theories of indirect copyright liability:
contributory and vicarious infringement. Contributory infringement applies
to those who participate in infringement, 262 and vicarious infringement
applies to those who benefit from infringement. 263 One or both theories
may apply to a particular indirect infringer. There are two requirements for
contributory liability: (1) knowledge or reason to know of the direct
infringement; and (2) the defendant either (a) causes, induces, or materially
261. The classic work on this subject is Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). For
applications to intellectual property law, see generally Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability
Rules: IntellectualProperty Rights and Collective Rights Organizations,84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996),

and Merges, supra note 149. Indirect copyright infringement would behave more like a tax scheme if
damages replaced injunctive remedies.
262. See Nintendo of Am. Inc. v. Computer & Entm't, Inc., No. C96-0187WD, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20975 (W.D. Wash. May 31, 1996) (finding that technology for sharing videogame cartridges
was likely to be infringing); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding
that a computer bulletin board operator who facilitated sharing of videogames was liable for
contributory copyright infringement); John Borland, MP3BoardSues AOL, Time Warner over Gnutella,
CNETNews.com, at http://news.com.com/2102-1023_3-244748.html (Aug. 21, 2000) (reporting that
MP3Board.com was sued for offering a search engine specializing in finding MP3 music files).
263. See, e.g., Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963);
Dreamland Ball Room v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th Cir. 1929).
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contributes to direct infringement. 264 There are also two requirements for
vicarious liability: (1) the right and ability to supervise the direct infringer,
265
and (2) a direct financial benefit from infringement.
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. and A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. explore the contours of the contributory
infringement doctrine as applied to the sharing of copyrighted works. In
Sony, Sony made and sold videotape machines capable of copying movies
that were broadcast on television. 266 The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit and refused to find Sony liable. The Court applied the fair use
doctrine to home users who recorded movies for the purpose of shifting
their viewing to a later time. 267 The Court also ruled that time-shifting is a
commercially significant purpose of videotape machines. 268 Therefore,
Sony could not be liable because its device was capable of a substantial,
269
noninfringing use.

In Napster, the Ninth Circuit approved (with modifications) a
preliminary injunction that ultimately brought an end to Napster's music
file-sharing service. 270 The court found direct infringement by Napster
users because of unauthorized copying and distribution of music. It rejected
the claim that music file-sharing was fair use. 27 1 Besides claiming fair use,
Napster argued that many composers authorized file-sharing, and so its
264. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001); Gershwin
Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971).
265. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1996).
266. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,419-20 (1984).
267. The Court emphasized that the copying in question was private and not for profit. Id. at 449.
Besides fair use, the Court also noted that some copyright owners authorized home videotaping. Id. at
445-46.
268. See id. at 422, 456.
269. Id. at 456.
270. Sharing of digital music files typically starts with a consumer purchasing a music CD. The
music on the CD can be copied onto a computer hard drive where it is usually compressed and stored in
a format called MP3. The service at issue in Napster facilitated anonymous MP3 music file-sharing.
Napster took three main actions to facilitate file-sharing. First, it distributed a free copy of its
MusicShare software. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
Second, it maintained a directory of music files currently available for download. Id. And third, it
matched users who wanted to transfer a music file. Id. To illustrate, suppose that Joe has a collection of
MP3 files on his hard drive that he is willing to share. He names his music files and sends a list of files
to Napster using MusicShare. Suppose another Napster user named Janet wants to download some
music files. She could search the directory and find a music file she wants that is available on Joe's
computer. She connects to Joe's computer through the Napster directory and copies the music file from
Joe's computer. The copied music does not reside or pass through Napster servers.
271. Napster argued that space-shifting and sampling were fair uses. Id. at 1014. Sampling, as
used here, means that the users make temporary copies of a work before purchasing, presumably to
listen to the music before deciding to purchase. Id.
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service should be insulated from indirect liability because of the safeharbor created by Sony.2 72 The court made some initially encouraging
remarks about the applicability of Sony, 273 but ultimately distinguished the
case by noting that Napster had actual knowledge of infringement.27 4 The
court observed that the Supreme Court might have imputed constructive
275
knowledge to Sony, but did not because of possible noninfringing uses.
Regarding vicarious liability, the Ninth Circuit concluded Napster got
a financial benefit from direct infringement because that activity builds a
Napster user base. 276 The court also held that Napster can supervise
users. 277 The court concluded: "Napster may be vicariously liable when it
fails to affirmatively use its ability to patrol its system and preclude access
to potentially infringing files listed in its search index. Napster has both the
ability to use its search function to identify infringing musical recordings
and the right to bar participation of users who engage in the transmission of
278
infringing files."
Napster disturbs the safe harbor created for device manufacturers in
Sony. Consumer electronic manufacturers and software companies cannot
be sure they will escape liability even though their product is capable of
substantial, noninfringing use. The risk of liability arises whenever they
arguably have knowledge of infringing use of their product. This risk can
be minimized by careful product design. For example, decentralized filesharing programs might steer clear of both the contributory and vicarious
272. Id. at 1026.
273. Unlike the district court, the Ninth Circuit recognized the Napster service was capable of
significant, noninfringing use:
The mere existence of the Napster system, absent actual notice and Napster's demonstrated
failure to remove the offending material, is insufficient to impose contributory liability....
[W]e place the burden on plaintiffs to provide notice to Napster of copyrighted works and
files containing such works available on the Napster system before Napster has the duty to
disable access to the offending content.
Id. at 1027.
274. See id.
275. See id. Judge Posner criticized this interpretation of Sony, and agreed with Paul Goldstein
"that actual knowledge of specific infringing uses is [not] a sufficient condition for deeming a facilitator
a contributory infringer." In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing 2
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 6.1.2 (2d ed. Supp. 2004), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1069 (2004).
276. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1023. Napster did not charge a fee to users. Id. at 1011. The Ninth
Circuit failed to explain how Napster could ever get any financial benefit, but it does seem reasonable
that a bigger user base will bring more revenue to Napster once it figures out how to get revenue.
277. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court regarding how much supervising Napster
can do, however. Id. at 1023-24.
278. Id. at 1027.
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liability theories of Napster.279 Several music file-sharing programs
280
eliminate the searchable centralized directory offered by Napster.
Instead, indexing and searching is done over the Internet using the
computers in the network. Thus, the distributor of the file-sharing software
28 2
has less control 281 of and less knowledge about infringing activity.
Another way to distinguish a device or service from Napster's service is to
impose limits on what kinds of files can be shared, whom a person can
283
share with, and how many times a person can upload a file for sharing.
For example, RePlayTV limits sharing to other subscribers and imposes
284
quantitative limits.
Indirect copyright liability substitutes for direct enforcement and selfhelp measures and helps refine the regulation of sharing. 285 Internet service
279. See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (granting
summary judgment to defendant seller of decentralized peer-to-peer music file-sharing software). See
also John Borland, Judge: File-Swapping Tools are Legal, CNETNews.com,
at
http://news.com.comJ2100-1027-3-998363.html (Apr. 25, 2003) (distinguishing the Napster case on the
grounds that Grokster and Streamcast lacked the control of users available to Napster because of its
central directory). "[N]either Grokster nor StreamCast provides the 'site and facilities'.... [I]f either
[one] closed their doors and deactivated all computers within their control, users of their products could
continue sharing files with little or no interruption." Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1041 (quoting
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022). The Aimster opinion wars, however, that "[w]illful blindness is
knowledge, in copyright law" and may be sufficient to create liability as a contributory infringer.
Aimster, 334 F.3d at 650.
280. John Borland, RIAA, File-Swappers Ask for Trial's End, CNETNews.com, at
http://news.com.com/2102-1023_3-957227.html (Sept. 9, 2002) (reporting that the software used by the
current generation of music file-sharing services is decentralized and does not require a central server
for swaps or searches).
281.
See Grokster, 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1045. If software is designed so that the designer has no
ongoing control, then maybe there is no liability.
282. Id. Practically speaking, the makers and distributors of decentralized file-sharing programs
are less attractive targets for litigation.
283. The peer-to-peer program, Aimster, offered the option of limiting sharing to those on a buddy
list, see LITMAN, supra note 228, at 166-67, Borland, supra note 87, but the program also offered an
anonymous file-sharing similar to Napster, see Aimster, 334 F.3d at 646.
284. See
ReplayTV
May
Strip
Ad
Skipping,
at
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,58957,00.html (May 22, 2003) (reporting that a new
owner has purchased RePIayTV from the bankrupt SONICblue and is considering removal of the send
show and commercial advance features from the product, the features that prompted lawsuits against
SONICblue).
285.
See WILLIAM LANDES & DOUGLAS LICHTMAN, INDIRECT LIABILITY FOR COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 12 (John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No.

179, 2003), at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html (proposing a negligence rule that
could be applied to the design of devices that facilitate copyright infringement). See generally Assaf
Hamdani, Who's Liable for Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (2002) (exploring the issue of
Internet service provider ("ISP") liability). The threat of indirect liability pushed manufacturers in
Europe to accept taxes on devices and media used to copy music, movies, and text. See Kevin Davis,
Fair Use on the Internet: A Fine Line Between Fair and Foul, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 129, 166-67 (1999). In
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providers and online intermediaries, 286 employers, 287 and universities 288 all
have some ability to monitor and control sharing of copyrighted works.
Indirect liability should be limited to cases in which it reduces enforcement
costs; 289 there is a danger that it will inefficiently shift enforcement
monitoring costs to third parties 290 and significantly discourage diffusion of
works with little corresponding gain in incentives.2 9 1 The threat of indirect
the United States, digital audiotape manufacturers agreed to a tax as part of a bargain to avoid indirect
copyright liability. See Ku, supra note 19, at 312-13.
286. ISPs that limit outgoing bandwidth can regulate P2P systems. Bernhard Warner, Music Exec:
at
http://www.canadianisp.com/cgifor
Music-Swapping,
Pay
Up
ISPs
Must
bin/forums/ikonboard.cgi?act=ST&f=22&t=903 (Jan. 18, 2003) (reporting that the RIAA has threatened
to sue ISPs unless they block user access to illicit music file-sharing sites). See also Kelly Yamanouchi,
AP Online, EBay Monitors for Copyright Woes, at 2001 WL 15175237 (Feb. 28, 2001) (reporting that
eBay and other online auction sites use software and employee inspection to detect and remove items
that infringe copyright).
287. See John Borland, Labels Turn Guns on Workplace Pirates, CNETNews.com, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-984548.html (Feb. 13, 2003) (reporting that the music and movie
industries are pressuring employers to stop file-swapping on their networks); Lisa M. Bowman, Labels
Settle At-Work Song-Share Dispute, CNETNews.com, at http://news.com.com/2100-10233879308.html (Apr. 9, 2002) (reporting that a company paid $1 million to settle a claim of indirect
infringement based on employee song swapping using the company server); Factiva Advertising and
Media Digest, Music Group Sends Piracy Complaints to 300 Firms, at 2003 WL 4428323 (Mar. 18,
2003) (reporting that RIAA sent letters warning employers of fines for copyright infringement).
288. See Dawn C. Chmielewski, Colleges Ambivalent About Anti-Piracy Role, at
http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/news/5205893.htm (Feb. 18, 2003) (reporting that
colleges assist copyright owners by combating sharing of music and video files by college students);
at
Files,
No
Sharing
to
Students:
USC
Brad
King,
http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/0,1285,55159,00.html (Sept. 13, 2002) (reporting that the University
of Southern California warned students that they could lose access to the university's computer system
and face disciplinary action for swapping music and movies online). At the peak of Napster's
popularity, seventeen universities banned the service from their computer systems. King, supra.
289. Two significant practical problems limit the ability of digital copyright owners to control
third parties. First, the global nature of the Internet encourages infringers to act in nations where it is
hard to enforce indirect copyright infringement claims. See Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of
Control, 44 B.C. L. REV 653, 683 (2003) (relating that in August 2002, thirteen American record
companies filed suit against five major American ISPs in an effort to block access to listen4ever.com, a
China-based web site providing unauthorized music downloads). Second, many third party targets are
judgment proof start-ups, or even more elusive open-source software communities. See Tim Wu, When
Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 731-32 (2003) (noting that Gnutella, an open source protocol, is a
decentralized file-sharing system intentionally designed to avoid lawsuits).
290. See LANDES & LICHTMAN, supra note 285, at 2 (arguing that indirect liability is socially
valuable because it encourages third parties to monitor and control direct infringers); Netanel, supra
note 3, at 11-17 (describing how copyright owners have attempted to shift enforcement costs related to
file-sharing to third parties).
Libraries are protected by § 108 from indirect liability attributable to spontaneous
291.
photocopying. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2000). Without this protection libraries might withdraw photocopiers
or monitor them closely. If libraries could negotiate a license on behalf of spontaneous copyists, then
they might have an incentive to limit patronage; for example, universities would have a stronger
incentive to exclude non-university library patrons. Cf Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document
Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381,1389 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (suggesting that users are free to delegate
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liability can add to social welfare by encouraging the design of products to
minimize unlawful sharing, but it can also chill the development and
diffusion of legitimate multi-purpose technology. 292 Finally, it creates a
danger of opportunistic and anticompetitive lawsuits, 293 and encourages
294
potential targets of indirect copyright suits to take costly evasive actions.
The threat of an indirect infringement suit gives copyright owners
some control over products that facilitate sharing, but they hope to gain
more direct control.29 5 The movie and music industries are pushing for a
federal mandate requiring that computer, television, and consumer
electronics manufacturers facilitate copy control by incorporating
copying to an agent and that the agent should be able to claim the same fair use privilege as ultimate
consumer).
292. LANDES & LICHTMAN, supra note 285, at 4 (arguing, on the one hand, that indirect liability is
socially valuable because it encourages companies like Sony and Napster to design products and
services in a way that discourages infringing use, but, on the other hand, indirect liability can be
socially harmful because it chills the development of new technology and interferes with noninfringing
activities). See John Borland, Hackers: iTunes Can Be Shared over Net, CNETNews.com, at
http://news.com.com2102-1027_3-1001121.html (May 12, 2003) (observing that Apple iTunes can be
programmed to allow anonymous streaming of music over the Internet, and that the limited bandwidth
available to most users means that a machine can only support a few listeners at a time); Jim Hu, AOL
Pulls Nullsoft File-Sharing Software, CNETNews.com, at http://news.com.com2102-1032_3101 1585.html (May 30, 2003) (reporting that a division of AOL has developed software that enables
secure, small-scale file-sharing networks open only to authorized participants); Neil Strauss, Apple
Finds a Route for Online Music Sales, N.Y.TIMES, May 29, 2003, at El (reporting that Apple removed
a service that allowed friends to stream music to each other because third parties developed software
that allowed the service to be used for file-sharing).
293. See John Borland, Kazaa Strikes Back at Hollywood, Labels, CNETNews.com, at
http://news.com.com/2102-1023_3-982344.html (Jan. 27, 2003) (reporting that the owner of filesharing service Kazaa sued members of the music industry for misuse and antitrust violations, based on
their alleged refusal to provide copy-protected music files for distribution, and is seeking to bar
enforcement of music copyrights). See generally Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and
Anti-Competitive Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509 (2003) (describing the
conditions that give rise to opportunistic and anticompetitive intellectual property lawsuits). The
district court judge in the Napster case found evidence that the music industry might have violated the
antitrust laws in the market for digital music distribution. See In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., No.
MDL 00-1369 MHP, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7236, at *38, *58 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2004). The
Department of Justice is investigating music industry activities in markets for digital music. See
Borland, supra. See also Dawn C. Chmielewski, Napster Troubles Leave Investors Wary of New
Technologies, at http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/5222200.htm (Feb. 20, 2003) (relating
that venture capitalists have been discouraged from funding certain technologies that might face indirect
copyright infringement suits).
294. See Graham, supra note 213 (reporting that new music file-sharing services claim they can
protect the identity of music downloaders).
295. It is unlikely, but possible, that a copyright owner could obtain some control over technology
through injunctive relief against an indirect infringer. See Netanel, supra note 3, at 13 (relating that the
music industry requested an injunction seeking to control routing systems in the Internet network
backbone).
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technology in their devices that will block unauthorized copying. 296 A
coalition of computer and other hi-tech companies has formed to oppose
the legislation. 297 Consumer resistance and pressure by consumer allies
may result in the opposite outcome. 298 Proposed legislation gives
consumers "the right to make backup copies of digital works for use on
other devices" and protects "consumers who bypass technological locks to
view a DVD movie on their laptops." 299 The legislative approach has
similar costs and benefits, but it probably poses a greater risk to innovation
300
because it is less flexible and more susceptible to political rent-seeking.
B. TAXES ON EQUIPMENT AND MEDIA

Commonly, European copyright statutes permit private copying but
also impose taxes on copying equipment and media that are paid to
296. See Benefit Authors Without Limiting Advancement or Net Consumer Expectations
(BALANCE) Act, H.R. 1066, 108th Cong. (2003); Netanel, supra note 3, at 14-15 (noting that
copyright owners have proposed legislation that would require consumer electronics manufacturers to
aid digital rights management efforts); John Borland, New Technology Could Help Squelch Digital
Music Piracy, CNETNews.com, at http://news.com.com/2102-1023-3-250340.html (Dec. 27, 2000)
(reporting that the National Committee for Information Technology Standards is developing a hardware
standard that "could prevent protected songs or movies from being copied using devices containing"
copy-protection technology); Consumers Could Lose out with Proposed Copy Protection Law, at
http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/2820764.htm (Mar. 8, 2002) (proposed federal
legislation would require digital electronic devices to include technology that prevents copying of
copyrighted music or movies); Amy Harmon, Movie Studios Press Congress in Digital Copyright
Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2002, at C3 ("[S]everal members of Congress urged the Federal
Communications Commission... to require that makers of computers, television sets and recording
devices embed technology into their machines to prevent TV viewers from redistributing digital
broadcasts over the Internet."); Lawmaker Pushes for Digital TV Deadline, CNETNews.com, at
http://news.com.com/2102-1023_3-958685.html (Sept. 19, 2002) (reporting that consumer electronics
manufacturers and media companies have failed so far to reach an agreement over the features of a
system that would allow consumers to make recordings of television programs for home use but prevent
them from sharing programs over the Internet).
297. See Borland, supra note 5; Declan McCullagh, Tech Firms Fight Copy-Protection Laws, at
http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1106-981882.html (Jan. 23, 2003).
298. See Mike Musgrove, Microsoft Easing up on DVD Restrictions: Copied Discs to Play on
More Devices, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2002, at E3 ("Microsoft Corp. announced yesterday that it is easing
the DVD-copying restrictions it planned to build into new entertainment software coming out this fall,
in response to consumer protests.").
299. Dawn C. Chmielewski, Lofgren Bill Backs Digital Copying for Personal Use, at
http://www.siliconvalley.comimld/siliconvalley/news/5365373.htm (Mar. I1,2003). See also H.R.
1066, 108th Cong. § 3(b)(l)(a)(2) (2003).
300. See John Markoff, A Safer System for Home PCs Feels Like Jail to Some Critics, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 2003, at Cl (reporting that new copy-protection technology "'will kill innovation ...
[and] mean that fewer software businesses succeed and those who do succeed will be large
companies."') (quoting Ross Anderson, computer security expert at Cambridge University).
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copyright owners. 30 1 For example, the taxes collected on blank audiotapes
and audio recording equipment are paid to music copyright owners. 30 2 The
only American experience with this approach to regulating sharing is the
little-used Audio Home Recording Act of 1992. 30' This Act imposes a tax
on digital audio tapes and digital tape recording machines that are
distributed to music copyright owners. 30 4 The European Union is extending
this approach to digital content, 30 5 and there are proposals to do likewise in
30 6

the United States.

American copyright law prefers to give the seller the right to control
sharing in order to encourage a blanket license, and when a blanket license
is not feasible, American law favors fair use. For example, home
videotaping of televised movies cannot be licensed because of transaction
301. See Lunney, supra note 84, at 853 n.137 (listing European levy provisions); Edmund L.
Andrews, Fighting Free Music, Europeans Take Aim at Personal Computers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
2001, at Al (noting that many European countries impose copyright fees on audio and videocassette
recorders and blank tapes). For a description of a system of levies on devices and materials used in
private copying, see discussion supra text accompanying notes 94-111. The revenue, however, from the
European private copying levies is small compared to the revenue derived from European performance
rights payments. Cf Lunney, supra note 14, at 1008 n.137 (explaining that European nations typically
allow users to make private copies of movies and music, but they must pay taxes that are distributed to
copyright owners on copying equipment and blank tapes).
Many European countries also give the copyright owner a lending right that provides a fee based
on the volume of lending activity. See Ginsburg, supra note 125, at 196 (describing Nordic countries'
photocopy license fees set as a price per page copied, as a lump-sum payment from each user, or
occasionally as a lump sum per inhabitant or per student).
302. See Eugene Ulmer & Hugo von Rauscher auf Weeg, German), (Federal Public), in
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT & NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 414, 422 (Stephen M. Stewart & Hamish
Sandison eds., 2d ed. 1989).
303. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-10 (2000). See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 90, at 162-63.
304. The act also imposed a sales tax of 3% on digital tapes and 2% on digital tape players. 17
U.S.C. § 1004.
305. New EU regulations preserve the private copy provisions for digital content. These
provisions allow consumers to make a small number of copies and share them with friends as long as
the copyright owner receives fair compensation. See Council Directive 2001/29/EC, art. 5(2)(b), 2001
O.J. (L 176) 10, 16; Lunney, supra note 84, at 854; Andrews, supra note 301 (reporting
that the German music industry supports fees on computer components that are used in
copying
music);
Intel,
Others
to
Oppose
Copyright
Tax,
at
http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/news/editorial/5109624.htm (Feb. 5, 2003) (reporting
that the German patent office recommends a tax of twelve euros on every computer sale with the
revenue used to compensate digital copyright owners).
306. See
William
Fisher,
Digital
Music:
Problems
and
Possibilities,
at
www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/tfisher/Music.html (Oct. 10, 2000) (describing a tax and royalty scheme
to support music production); Netanel, supra note 3, at 35-59 (proposing a tax on consumer products
and services associated with file-sharing of copyrighted digital content). But see Music Execs Go after
Internet Services in Song-Swap War, at http://www.usatoday.comltech/news/techpolicy/2003-01-24music-ispx.htm (Jan. 24, 2003) (reporting that the RIAA has no plans to develop compulsory licensing
arrangements for Internet music swapping).
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costs; American copyright law gives users the right to copy but Europeans
favor a tax on blank videotapes. Similarly, photocopier uses with low

transaction costs are subject to licensing in the United States, and uses with
high transaction costs are fair use. Again, many European countries favor a
tax on photocopy supplies and equipment. It is difficult to tell which

approach leads to greater social welfare.3 °7
Taxation and blanket licensing both discourage the development of
copying technology. 30 8 This social cost 30 9 is probably greater for blanket
310
licensing because licensing usually leaves less surplus to consumers.
Consumer surplus from using the copying technology is an incentive to
create it.
Taxation and blanket licensing have a similar effect on the market for
the shared work-sharing is permitted and the tax revenue received by the
copyright owner rises as the number of people sharing rises. Compared to
licensing, profit is generally lower under a tax scheme, even if the tax
revenue is paid to the copyright owner. Profit tends to be lower because
sellers lose control over sharing; a single linear tax rate is chosen by the
government. Site licensing permits each seller to choose a nonlinear royalty
schedule for each copyrighted work. This point can be illustrated in an
example in which X and Y each have a valuation of 3 and they form a
coalition with a total valuation of 6. Z has a valuation of 5. Suppose that
sharing requires the use of equipment or media bearing a tax that will be
collected and paid to the copyright owner. If the tax is set at 2, then the
seller will choose a price of 4, sell two units, and collect sales plus tax
revenue of 10. This is less than the 11 that can be obtained with the optimal
307. Janusz Ordover and Robert Willig develop a model of library photocopying and show that
library lending fees are part of a socially optimal copyright policy. See Janusz A. Ordover & Robert D.
Willig, On the Optimal Provision of Journalsqua Sometimes Shared Goods, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 324,
333-34 (1978). They observe that the user who is indifferent between library use and personal
subscription will choose a subscription to avoid a lending fee. This causes a first order increase in profit
but causes only a second order loss to the consumer. A reduction in subscription fees that returns sellers
to their original profit level will increase consumer surplus. Id. Liebowitz counters that a public lending
right is unnecessary because copyright owners price discriminate by charging libraries a higher
subscription fee than they charge to individuals. See Liebowitz, supranote 87, at 194.
308. See Lunney, supra note 84, at 856-57 (arguing that a levy inefficiently discourages the
diffusion of copying technology); Netanel, supra note 3, at 68-73 (noting that a levy might impede the
development of certain technologies but arguing a levy can be tailored to mitigate this problem). Cf
LANDES & LICHTMAN, supranote 285, at 12 (noting that indirect liability functions like a tax).
309. This might be socially desirable if the copying technology is inefficient compared to the
seller's distribution technology. It might also be socially desirable as a way to discourage a technology
"arms race."
310. See Liebowitz, supra note 29, at 10 (arguing against taxes but noting that writeable CDs and
their drives might be a sensible target for a tax).
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site license. If the tax is reduced to 1, then the seller will set a price of 5,
sell two units, and collect a total profit of 11. If the tax is greater than or
equal to 3, then X and Y will not share, the seller will set a price of 3, sell
three units, and collect a total profit of 9. Incorrectly setting the tax hurts
both profit and social welfare. The government might do poorly setting the
tax because of informational problems and
the hazard that private interest
3 11
rate.
tax
the
over
control
exert
will
groups
Taxation and licensing both discourage the formation of marginal
coalitions and marginal sharing, 312 but taxation is normally a greater
deterrent to sharing because the seller will design a blanket license to
encourage as much sharing as possible. 313 Blanket licenses often use lumpsum royalties that are linked to observable characteristics of the customer,
rather than royalties that rise with the number of sharing users. Sellers
choose lump-sum schemes because they want to encourage the optimal
level of sharing and then extract surplus from the sharing users with a high
lump-sum fee. A high lump-sum fee may deter the formation of a marginal
coalition, but it never discourages marginal sharing by licensees. Taxes that
discourage sharing by small coalitions leave a bi-modal pattern of large
coalitions and singletons. Profit suffers because the coalition diversity
effect is worsened. When everyone is part of a coalition and coalition size
is endogenous, then the tax pushes coalition size up. This creates a social
cost because coalitions are too big, which aggravates waiting times. On the
other hand, it reduces demand dispersion by increasing the aggregation
effect.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Optimal policy toward sharing tries to satisfy two goals that are often
in conflict: providing an appropriate incentive for the creation of
copyrighted works, and maximizing total surplus from consumption of
these products once they are created. Copyright owners decry sharing
because it threatens productive incentives. Users' rights advocates defend
sharing that mitigates market failures and increases access to copyrighted
works. A policy that always forbids sharing without permission is probably
not optimal. It does have the desirable effect of maximizing the incentive
for creation. But a right to share may be socially desirable because the
311.
See LANDES & LICHTMAN, supra note 285, at 13.
312.
See Lunney, supra note 84, at 855-56 (noting that a levy inefficiently discourages use).
313.
A tax on copying devices might act like a sunk cost-that is, a cost that does not influence
sharing behavior. This is likely the case for general purpose technologies and when the tax is relatively
small.
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current incentive for creation is too large, or because giving users the right
to share causes total surplus to grow significantly relative to the loss of
profit-based incentive.
When the law requires permission to share, a rational seller will
authorize sharing if and only if it increases profit. Sellers profit from
sharing when it is an efficient means of producing and distributing their
product, when it smoothes demand, when it increases the value of their
product, or when it facilitates price discrimination. Often, the seller's profit
motive is aligned with the social interest in maximizing total surplus; thus,
sellers authorize socially valuable forms of sharing and prevent socially
costly forms of sharing.
A mismatch between sellers' profit motives and the public interest in
total surplus maximization may arise when sellers use copyright law to
push for the development of too many markets. If there were no market at
all for a copyrighted work, then probably there would be too little incentive
to produce the work. Therefore, establishing the "first" market for the work
is socially desirable. An economist would say that the positive externality
problem was solved by creating a market. Copyright-protected industries
are unusual because there are often multiple markets governing different
uses of a single copyrighted work. The economic presumption in favor of
creating the first market does not apply to these additional markets.
Additional markets might be socially desirable because they promote
expanded output (such as the market for public performance of music), or
they might be socially harmful because they engender relatively high social
costs (as is the case, perhaps, with the market for photocopy licenses
applicable to corporate research). Good policy toward sharing of
copyrighted works should not encourage more markets; it should encourage
the right number of markets.

